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THE ANALYSIS OF NEGATIVE INFLUENCE FACTORS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OPERATIONAL AND SERVICE ACTIVITIES IN THE AREAS OF THE STATE BORDER WITH AN AGGRAVATED MILITARY-POLITICAL SITUATION

The article analyses the factors that negatively affect the implementation of operational and service activities in the areas of the state border with an aggravated military-political situation. It is noted that during the period of sharp aggravation of the military-political situation in the areas of responsibility of border guard detachments, the enemy massively used sabotage and reconnaissance groups. The main tasks of these groups are presented.

The authors reveal the discrepancy between the need to counteract sabotage and terrorist threats in the areas of responsibility of border guard detachments in the context of a sharp aggravation of the military-political situation and the lack of a specific methodological apparatus.

Certain peculiarities of organization of operational and service activities in the context of a sharp aggravation of the military-political situation in the areas of responsibility of border guard detachments were analyzed.

The main factors of negative impact on the effectiveness of operational and service activities in the areas of the State border with an aggravated military-political situation are formed, as well as the scale of data significance for threat assessment and risk analysis in the area of responsibility of the border guard detachment.

Keywords: *State Border Guard Service of Ukraine; aggravation of the situation, military-political situation; implementation of operational and service activities; counteraction to enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups; factors; situation; armed aggression.*

Statement of the problem. The experience gained by the border guard units (BGU) of the Ukrainian Defense Forces during the war with the Russian Federation (RF) determines necessity in review of outdated approaches to the organization of operational and service activities (OSA) in the areas of the state border where the external military-political situation is complicated and may be transformed into a sharp aggravation.

The military-political situation (MPS) on the eastern, northern and southern directions of the state (armed aggression of the Russian Federation) has led to changes in the values of threat indicators in almost all areas of national security of Ukraine, including border security, which objectively conditioned a review of the organization of OSA at the state border of Ukraine (SBU).

It is during the period of sharp aggravation of MPS in order to prepare the conditions in the border areas of Ukraine for the transition to further armed provocations on the SBU, which may turn into open armed aggression, in the areas of responsibility of the border guard detachments (BGD), the enemy is

massively using sabotage and reconnaissance groups (SRG), before which are tasked with defeating (destroying) logistics facilities at the border, military facilities, checkpoints across the SBU, critical infrastructure facilities of state, local (district) significance, mobile communication relay facilities, bridges, establishing various ambush plans, etc. [1–7].

The enemy uses trained Russian military personnel (including mercenaries) who knows the peculiarities of the area, have connections with the local population (family, friendship, agents, etc.), have knowledge of the location of the Ukrainian defense forces, weapons and equipment, tactics of border guard units (BGU) and their equipment and combat capabilities, etc.

It is the prevention (timely detection) of potential enemy intentions to implement destabilization measures in the border areas (to cause, for example, "controlled chaos") that allows for the necessary time to make management decisions on the organization of countermeasures and to prevent (reduce) critical changes in the conditions (factors) of the situation.

The above confirms the fact that there is a need to improve the tactics of using border guard units in the conditions under consideration and the need to synthesize creative approaches (tricks) to their (BGU) use on the basis of strengthening the analytical component to predict possible enemy actions and prevent the disclosure of BGU intentions.

Military command and control bodies (in particular BGD) should carry out all work on planning n -measures to counter an enemy n -SRG in such a way as to complete it in time and provide elements of the operational structure with as much time as possible to prepare for the performance of tasks to counter the enemy.

For obvious reasons, in the simulated situations under consideration, the available forces and means of BGD will not be sufficient (even with the additional involvement of the reserve of the senior chief), which requires studying and formulating offers for the involvement of interacting units of the state security and defense forces in the performance of tasks.

The above indicates a discrepancy between the need to counter sabotage and terrorist threats in the areas of responsibility of border guard detachments in the context of a sharp aggravation of MPS and the lack of a specific methodological apparatus as a tool for solving this applied problem. Resolving this discrepancy will allow further development of scientifically based recommendations for the head of a border guard detachment.

From the point of view of the methodology of scientific research, in order to resolve this discrepancy, it is first of all necessary to analyze the factors that negatively affect the implementation of the OSA in the areas of the state border with an aggravated military-political situation, which determines the content of this article.

Analysis of recent research and publications.

A lot of attention has been paid to the study of issues related to the organization of OSA in general. Thus, the tools for implementing the methodology for the rational distribution of elements of the official order of the border guard units to suppress armed provocations at the state border were tested in research [8]. The essence of this methodology is the combined use of the methodology developed by the author of this methodology and known partial models, indicators and criteria for the distribution of elements of the service order of BGD during the termination of armed provocations at the state border, which allows to formulate the most effective (rational) options for such distribution.

The scientific research [9] presents a methodology for determining the rational use of

mobile groups during the complication of the situation at the state border.

The methodology for the integrated use of military and non-military forces and means of the security and defense sector to counter modern threats to Ukraine's military security is substantiated [10].

Paying tribute to the existing scientific developments, it should be noted that they do not take into account the current factors that affect the situation in the border area and the effectiveness of the implementation of OSA of BGD, but they can be the basis for further scientific research.

The purpose of the article is to substantiate the main factors of negative impact on the effectiveness of the implementation of operational and service activities in relation to countering sabotage and intelligence groups of the enemy in the areas of the state border with an aggravated military-political situation on the basis of the analysis of known sources of information regarding the indicated research problem and taking into account the personal experience of the authors.

Summary of the main material. The relevance of the topic is determined:

- the need to counteract sabotage, reconnaissance and terrorist activities in the area of responsibility of border guard detachments during the period of sharp aggravation of MPS;

- the possibility of the enemy's massive use of SRGs in the area of responsibility of the border guard detachment during the period of sharp aggravation of MPS;

- the enemy's attempts to achieve intermediate goals in a single plan of operation of heterogeneous forces and means;

- the need to determine the capabilities to effectively achievement the goals of countering enemy SRGs based on prediction the need for n -measures to counter enemy's n -SRGs during the period of sharp aggravation of MPS;

- the need to implement the interaction of the forces and means of BGD with other actors of the state security and defense forces during participating in the implementation of n -measures to counter the enemy's n -SRGs in the event of an aggravation of MPS, to perform a set of tasks in the area of responsibility of BGD in the conditions of a sharp aggravation of MPS.

It is worth noting that in the context of comprehensive defense, Ukraine is continuing systematic work on the implementation of NATO standards in national legislation and regulations to

ensure their use in the performance of assigned tasks by all subjects of national security and to achieve compliance with the criteria for full membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

At the same time, the United States and other partner countries are carefully studying the experience of the real battlefield, often simply by transferring the same conditions to training grounds [11, 12]. This process is ongoing. The military events currently taking place on the frontlines in Ukraine are forcing the US army to rethink the current reality. This confirms the uniqueness of the experience gained by the state's defense forces and reveals the need to flexibly change approaches to the use of available forces and means, taking into account the conditions of the latest theatre of war and the enemy's constantly bifurcating actions, and to draw conclusions based on analysis and research.

Thus, it can be partially concluded that today there is a lack of methodological support adequate to the current situation (discussed in this article) that could be used in the preparation of offers for making informed management decisions on organizing counteraction to enemy SRG at the state border.

In order to reveal the quintessence of the issues outlined in this article, it is reasonable to note that during the aggravation of MPS, it is advisable to entrust border guard units with the following tasks:

- strengthening operational and investigative activities in the interests of the military command;
- participation in termination the enemy's armed invasion at the border;
- participation in the fight against sabotage and reconnaissance and terrorist groups (detachments) and small tactical air and marine landings, as well as enemy gangs in the border areas;
- fulfilment of certain tasks of the military command for the operational disguise of our troops and disinformation of the enemy;
- by assisting the troops of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) to ensure the pass of Ukrainian forces, military equipment and material assets across the state border, etc.

Thus, in the context of a sharp aggravation of MPS, the importance of state border protection and other actions of border units in the overall national security system of the country is growing.

During this period, the state border is heavily guarded. The most typical actions of the units are searching for and eliminating enemy agents, sabotage and reconnaissance and terrorist groups, as well as termination of enemy military and political provocations on the border.

The following measures are expected to strengthen the protection of the state border in the context of a sharp aggravation of MPS:

- intensification of all types of intelligence;
- concentrating the main forces and means of border protection on the most important areas and increasing the depth of protection;
- deployment of powerful mobile reserves;
- transition to the use of tactical methods of action by border guard units that ensure success in the fight against well-armed and equipped enemy operating as part of sabotage and reconnaissance and terrorist groups, against invasions by military units and large unarmed masses of civilians;
- wide involvement of forces and means from interacting units of the Armed Forces and other defense forces in border protection;
- increased assistance from the local population and especially from voluntary organizations;
- additional measures for the engineering equipment of border protection;
- introduction of additional security measures in the border area.

The border guard detachment carries out the above measures, taking into account the peculiarities of the situation, the nature of the enemy's actions, the physical- geographical conditions of the protected section of the state border, etc.

Particular attention is paid to forming the protection of the state border, creating the main densities of forces and means in the areas of concentration of main efforts (AoME). The forming of protection in AoME should exclude the possibility of the enemy break through to the rear of the state or returning abroad. These areas can be equipped with defense areas and areas for the deployment of reserve forces of BGD, deployment of support units of AFU and other security and defense forces.

Border guard detachments may be reinforced by infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, anti-tank weapons, mine-clearing equipment, etc., during the aggravation of MPS, and their actions may be supported by mortar batteries, combat helicopters, etc.

The state border guards use appropriate tactics and actions typical of the period of sharp aggravation of the MPS.

Thus, it can be logically concluded that the success of the actions of BGD to repel an armed invasion and termination of other enemy provocations at the state border depends on advance preparation for countermeasures (combat operations, etc.), correct identification of the AoME, etc.

In this regard, there is a need for such measures:

- conducting continuous reconnaissance of enemy forces in the border states;
- detecting the situation in the neighboring territory and timely detection of the enemy's preparations for armed and other provocations;
- clarifying the plans of possible combat actions of BGD and systematically adjusting them and training the personnel;
- maintaining constant combat readiness of strongholds and other defensive structures and barriers;
- continuous improvement of the combat readiness of personnel;
- taking measures in training activities of interaction in case of joint actions with neighboring BGD, support units, local population and defense forces;
- implementation of cyber warfare measures, countering enemy electronic intelligence;
- strengthening operational and investigative activities in close cooperation with the relevant units with law enforcement and intelligence functions;
- implementation of measures to combat air targets (including enemy UAVs);
- creating and preparation for action of mobile combat reserves.

During martial law, BGD performs its tasks in a special period.

Under certain conditions, when the enemy uses non-standard measures to influence the situation in the border area of Ukraine, it can also use non-military forces and means (e.g. illegal migrants, civilians, etc.), which leads to special measures.

Such actions include: searching for offenders, localization of crisis situations; performing other tasks with the use of weapons, special equipment and means of physical influence.

Special measures to search for offenders are carried out in the event of information about violations, attempts or preparations to violate the border by groups whose actions pose a threat to the health and lives of residents of the controlled border areas. Such special measures involve the comprehensive simultaneous use of forces and means of the border guard detachment, reserves of neighboring border guard detachments, regional directorates, and in some cases, the reserves of the Head of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine in certain areas.

The main methods of action of forces and means during special measures to search for offenders are:

pursuit, cover (blocking), search, encirclement, detention (neutralization).

Thus, when formulating offers for decision-making measures to counter an enemy's SRG, there is a need to develop all possible models of options for the use of forces and means that will achieve the final result of countering SRG and choose a rational model of options. However, in practice, the military command and control bodies of BGD do not have sufficient information and time resources to develop all models of options.

When formation of offers for solutions for organizing OSA are developed by the HQ of BGD, they are usually limited to several alternative models that are acceptable and meet the capabilities of BGD. Moreover, these solutions are selected taking into account the limitations, opportunities and criteria for their evaluation. At the same time, as justified above, the enemy in the area of responsibility of BGD can conduct both single actions of using SRG and massive ones to achieve intermediate goals in a single operation plan using heterogeneous forces and means. Therefore, there is a threat of making management decisions that are not adequate to the situation.

Thus, the analysis of the submitted and other information made it possible to identify the main factors of negative impact on the effectiveness of OSA implementation in the areas of the state border with escalated MPS (see Table 1), as well as to form a scale of data significance for threat assessment and risk analysis in the area of responsibility of the border guard detachment during a sharp aggravation of MPS (see Table 2).

Thus, the effectiveness of decisions on the use of border units is significantly influenced by the timeliness, completeness and reliability of analytically processed specific information received from the information and analytical support system. At the same time, it takes a long time from the moment of receipt and confirmation of anticipatory information about a possible violation of the legislation on the state border to the decision on its implementation, and the information received loses its relevance [9], which causes further search for ways to eliminate this problem.

Table 1 – Factors of negative impact on the effectiveness of operational and service activities in the areas of the state border with an aggravated military-political situation

No.	Name of the factor	The nature of the negative impact	Ways to solve the problem
1	Lack of prognostic information	Lack of prognostic information on the intentions (goals) of the enemy's SRGs in the area of BGD causes significant uncertainty in the purpose of decisions on the use of BGU, their number, weapons and equipmen	Development of tools that allow predicting the intentions of the SRG in the area of responsibility of the BGD with an acceptable level of information reliability, efficiency and completeness. Organization of cooperation with the subjects of ensuring the national security of Ukraine, the state defense forces, the local population, etc.
2	Lack of information on the tactics of the SRGs, their weapons, means of communication, etc.	Causes uncertainty about force generation and countermeasures	Organization of cooperation with the subjects of ensuring the national security of Ukraine, the state defense forces, local population, etc. in order to obtain information with a sufficient degree of reliability for decision-making
3	The enemy's use of cyber weapons and Electronic signals intelligence	Insufficient protection of operational information, unclear communication between the BGU and the headquarters	Use of electronic warfare and cyber defense equipment. Organization of personnel training on compliance with radio communication rules, etc.
4	Enemy use of UAVs (reconnaissance, kamikaze, combat)	Exposing the positions of BGU, defeating border patrols and defensive structures, etc.	Provision and use of UAV destruction means by BGU, use of mobile fire groups, electronic warfare means. Personnel training
5	The possibility of the enemy using several SRG simultaneously in different areas, with different goals	Possible breakthroughs of SRG with various negative consequences. Abrupt change in the situation in the area of responsibility of the BGD	Development of tools that make it possible to predict the intentions of the SRG in the area of responsibility of BGD with an acceptable level of information reliability, efficiency and completeness. Rational allocation of available forces and means, involvement of additional reserves
6	Insufficient tactical training of border guard personnel	With the emergence of new threats and challenges on the state border, it became necessary to introduce new provisions on tactics of actions in different conditions (different options for implementing these conditions)	Introduction to the professional training of border guard personnel experience and best practices of actions in different conditions, training of special units (in the form of individual training, situational training, comprehensive practical exercises)
7	Mobile BGU by the decisions of the heads of BGD transformed into "units for strengthening the protection of the state border". The basic principle of their use is ignored – the use of mobile forces as part of specialized self-sufficient elements designed to perform their functions in the area of responsibility	The personnel of mobile BGUs are subordinated to the heads of border guard departments; long-term business trips; border patrols from mobile border guard units may be sent out without vehicles; personnel are involved in tasks not typical for mobile BGUs	The heads of BGD shall exercise constant control over the use of mobile BGUs in order to perform their functions

End of Table 1

No.	Name of the factor	The nature of the negative impact	Ways to solve the problem
8	Lack of motivation of personnel to perform tasks and serve in border guard units	The units perform tasks in the areas of responsibility of the BGDs that pose an increased threat to the life and health of the personnel, and are staffed by unmotivated personnel. Chiefs do not participate in the selection of personnel for their units	Establish a system for selecting (on the basis of special purpose units, taking into account the border specifics of performing tasks) military personnel for border units. Ensuring staffing levels. Conducting timely rotation
9	Logistical support for border guard units needs to be improved	It is necessary to organize the maintenance of vehicles and special equipment at specialized service centers. Additional provision of the necessary technical means for the efficient performance of tasks	Improving logistical support not only in terms of actual availability, but also in terms of application and maintenance

Table 2 – Scale of significance of data for threat assessment and risk analysis in the area of responsibility of the border guard detachment during the sharp aggravation of MPS

No.	Data	Weight α_i of data
1	Data obtained by the headquarters of BGD based on statistical observations, situational analysis, analysis of the results of OSA, and criminal analysis	0,025
2	Results of analytical studies conducted by the interacting units of the Defense Intelligence, Foreign Intelligence Service, Security Service of Ukraine, Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine	0,019
3	Data on the results of OSA, on the nature of changes in the situation at the state border	0,028
4	Documentary and analytical-synthetic information materials that characterize the threat environment	0,022
5	Information from legal acts related to the border area	0,025
6	Information on the forms and methods of OSA implemented in the context of a sharp escalation of MPS	0,016
7	Data on the structure, number and staffing of private security companies involved in the protection of SBU in the context of a sharp aggravation of MPS	0,028
8	Information on the state of training of the personnel of the BGU of the BGD	0,025
9	Data on weapons and equipment used by BGU at the border	0,025
10	Data on enemy tactics, tricks and weapons	0,019
11	Data on the status of countermeasures against enemy electronic warfare	0,013
12	Data on the probable targets of the enemy's SRG	0,019
13	Data on measures to combat air targets (including enemy UAVs)	0,025
14	Data on actors who pose threat and weaknesses in their activities	0,025
15	Data on the possibility of 24 hours monitoring of the operational situation at the state border	0,022
16	Data on the status of border guard units (may be characterised by various quantitative and qualitative indicators, such as the number and staffing of personnel)	0,022
17	Data on the degree of readiness of BGU for OSA in the context of aggravation of MPS	0,025
18	Time to achieve the goal of the solution	0,022
19	Brief description of the situation: military-political, operational-tactical, etc.; groups of elements of the situation – permanent and variable – are indicated	0,022

End of the Table 2

No.	Data	Weight α_i of data
20	Data on the formation and preparation of mobile combat reserves	0,019
21	Data on the objectives of the decision (a brief description of the desired state of the environment is given, qualitative and quantitative requirements for the elements of the environment are formulated)	0,022
22	Criteria for evaluating tasks assigned to the units of BGD	0,019
23	Information on restrictions on the composition of forces and means	0,022
24	Data on the organization of cybersecurity measures	0,016
25	Results of the analysis of the operational situation in the area of responsibility of the divisions for the reporting period	0,025
26	The results of the forecast of the operational situation in the area of responsibility of the unit for a certain period	0,025
27	Results of calculations of the direction of concentration of the main forces and means	0,025
28	Data on the status of the situation data collection (acquisition) system	0,022
29	Data on the status of control and security measures	0,022
30	Data on the status of engineering and technical control systems	0,019
31	Data on the status of standby forces (assets) and reserve systems	0,019
32	Data on the state of civilian protection systems	0,016
33	Data on the status of systems of interaction with the Armed Forces of Ukraine	0,022
34	Data on the status of operational and service systems	0,022
35	Data on the state of systems of interaction with law enforcement and executive authorities	0,019
36	Data on the status of border guard management systems	0,022
37	Data on the state of the systems for preparing reserves for border protection tasks	0,022
38	Data on the state of control of operational and service activities	0,016
39	Data on the state of control of the border guard duties	0,016
40	Data on the state of control over the performance of inspectors	0,016
41	Data on the state of control of the camouflage service	0,016
42	Data on the equipment of defense areas and firing lines for the deployment of the reserve BGD, deployment lines of support units of the Armed Forces and other defense forces	0,019
43	Data on structures and means of engineering barriers	0,016
44	Data on visual and radio surveillance network points	0,019
45	Data on border roads	0,022
46	Data on helicopter landing sites	0,016
47	Data on fortifications and other facilities	0,022
48	Data on the possibility of 24 hours monitoring, on preparations for attempts to smuggle groups of illegal migrants, weapons, ammunition, etc. across the state border	0,025
49	Other data	0,025

Conclusions

Thus, the experience gained during combat operations with the invading units of the Russian Federation, the authors' personal experience in organizing the service of border guard units in areas of responsibility where the enemy intensively uses sabotage and reconnaissance groups, analysis of open sources and known scientific and methodological support cause the necessity to review of outdated approaches to the organization of operational and service activities in areas of the

state border with a complex military-political situation that could escalate into an open military aggression.

The analysis of the submitted and other information made it possible to formulate the main factors of negative impact on the effectiveness of operational and service activities in the areas of the state border with an aggravated military-political situation, as well as to form a scale of data significance for threat assessment and risk analysis in the area of responsibility of the border guard detachment during a sharp aggravation of the military-political situation.

In further research, it is advisable to pay attention to a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the existing scientific and methodological support to formulate offers for its improvement, taking into account the current and predicted conditions for performing the tasks by border units at the state border areas under the conditions under consideration, and to find ways to improve the system of information and analytical support for the activities of border units.

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АНАЛІЗ ЧИННИКІВ, ЯКІ НЕГАТИВНО ВПЛИВАЮТЬ НА РЕАЛІЗАЦІЮ ОПЕРАТИВНО-СЛУЖБОВОЇ ДІЯЛЬНОСТІ НА ДІЛЯНКАХ ДЕРЖАВНОГО КОРДОНУ ІЗ ЗАГОСТРЕНОЮ ВОЄННО-ПОЛІТИЧНОЮ ОБСТАНОВКОЮ

Проведено аналіз чинників, які негативно впливають на реалізацію оперативно-службової діяльності на ділянках державного кордону із загостреною воєнно-політичною обстановкою. Акцентовано увагу на тому, що в період різкого загострення воєнно-політичної обстановки на ділянках відповідальності прикордонних загонів противником масово застосовуються диверсійно-розвідувальні групи. Наведено основні завдання зазначених груп.

Розкрито невідповідність між необхідністю протидії загрозам диверсійного і терористичного характеру в районах відповідальності прикордонних загонів в умовах різкого загострення воєнно-політичної обстановки та відсутністю специфічного методичного апарату.

Проаналізовано певні особливості організації оперативно-службової діяльності в умовах різкого загострення воєнно-політичної обстановки на ділянках відповідальності прикордонних загонів.

Сформовано основні чинники негативного впливу на ефективність реалізації оперативно-службової діяльності на ділянках державного кордону із загостреною воєнно-політичною обстановкою, а також шкалу значущості даних для оцінювання загроз та аналізу ризиків на ділянці відповідальності прикордонного загону.

Указано на необхідність комплексного і системного аналізу наявного науково-методичного забезпечення, формування пропозицій щодо його вдосконалення з урахуванням існуючих та прогнозованих умов виконання завдань прикордонними підрозділами на ділянках державного кордону за умов, що розглядаються.

Ключові слова: *Державна прикордонна служба України, загострення обстановки, загострення воєнно-політичної обстановки, реалізація оперативно-службової діяльності, протидія диверсійно-розвідувальним групам противника, чинники, обстановка, збройна агресія.*

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