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THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PECULIARITIES OF THE IMPACT OF POST-CONVENTIONAL WAR ON THE WORLDVIEW DIMENSION OF THE PERSONALITY OF SERVICEMEN

The authors identifies the main ideological features of post-conventional wars and their differences from wars of previous types – conventional and hybrid wars – which lead to ideological changes. The authors substantiates the need for philosophical reflection on the experience of post-conventional warfare and the development of effective concepts for responding to the ideological challenges it generates.

Keywords: *philosophy, worldview, post-conventional war, worldview changes, worldview challenges.*

Statement of the problem. The full-scale aggression of the Russian Federation against the Ukrainian state has led to the emergence of a new type of war – post-conventional. This requires a scientific and philosophical understanding of the experience of post-conventional warfare, identification of its ideological features and ideological differences from previous types of wars – non-conventional, conventional and hybrid, as well as the development of effective concepts of reflection and response to the systemic challenges it creates.

Analysis of recent research and publications. It is quite natural that the phenomenon of war has been the subject of philosophical reflection since ancient times. The problems of war and peace are covered by such authors as Confucius, Sun Tzu, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Machiavelli, F. Bacon, I. Kant, G. Hegel, C. Clausewitz, F. Nietzsche, A. Meehan, F. Fukuyama, S. Huntington, J. Habermas [1–6, 13], and others. Some works analyse only certain aspects of the scientific understanding of the essence of the worldview transformation caused by war in general and post-conventional war in particular, without their complex interconnection, and do not consider the systemic worldview challenges it creates.

Analysis of these and other works shows that:

– in scientific research, insufficient attention has been paid to the peculiarities of the worldview transformation of war as one of the two main states of human existence;

– the well-known theoretical views on the worldview transformation caused by wars do not correspond to the real situation caused by the full-

scale aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine.

Some aspects of this problem have been covered in scientific works [1–18], but the need for its in-depth development is due to the practical demands and needs of the National Guard of Ukraine as a component of the defence forces of our state.

This has led to a contradiction between the need to use scientifically based views on the worldview transformation in the context of modern military conflict (post-conventional war) and the systemic challenges it generates, and the inability to do so at the current level of coverage.

The relevance of this problem, its insufficient theoretical study and practical development have necessitated a scientific and philosophical understanding of the experience of worldview transformation caused by the post-conventional war, the development of effective concepts of philosophical reflection and response to the challenges it poses.

The purpose of the article is to provide a scientific and philosophical understanding of the worldview paradigm of post-conventional warfare as a new form of armed conflict of our time, to develop effective concepts of philosophical reflection and response to the challenges it poses.

Summary of the main material. The question of war and peace as one of the main worldview dichotomies in human history has always been the focus of attention of philosophers, and later of the global scientific community, both theorists and practitioners [1–6, 15]. The philosophical reflection on war was aimed at finding out the causes of wars

and finding ways to prevent them [2, 4, 5, 6, 8]. This approach led to the fact that all philosophers and scientists who reflected on war can be divided into two main groups: thinkers who perceived war as one of the two states of being of humanity (war and peace), and thinkers who fundamentally denied the need for war and sought ways to eliminate it. Thus, the most appropriate typifying concept of the causes of wars, in the opinion of the authors of this article, is the teleological one, which implies the existence of three main schools: catastrophic, eschatological and political [2, 4, 5, 6, 8].

The catastrophic school's understanding of the nature of war is based on the worldview of war as an exclusively destructive phenomenon devoid of any other meaning. Representatives of this school include Heraclitus, Hobbes, Kant, Descartes, Voltaire and many other philosophers who sought to make it impossible for war to exist as an objective phenomenon [1–6]. Ethno- and religion-centric catastrophism is an integral part of the catastrophists' general approach. The most paradoxical thing is that one of the most prominent representatives of this school is Leo Tolstoy, a representative of the "great russian culture". He is known all over the world for his novel *War and Peace*, in which the catastrophic approach is embodied with maximum imaginative power. For comparison: Pushkin's *Poltava*, Lermontov's *Borodino*.

The next area is eschatological, which views any war as leading to a goal and argues that sooner or later there will be a war of wars. With this in mind, we can distinguish two main theories in the eschatology of war: global and messianic. Globalists dream of a new society, utopian or dystopian, while messianisms dream of the kingdom of a good God. The Christian concept of Armageddon is a dualistic combination of the two main approaches [1–6].

The political school, whose most prominent representative is Clausewitz [8–11], views war as a tool for continuing politics and is based on the rationalism and hypercriticism of the European philosophical school [1–6, 8–11]. According to them, war, as an objective phenomenon of human existence, must be rational, obey the laws of logic, and lead to a certain predictable outcome in which the benefits should exceed the costs [7].

Thus, the historical periodisation of the worldview transformation of mankind, which includes mythological, religious and scientific and philosophical types of worldview, is generally accepted in philosophy [1–7].

Let us consider them in more detail. The mythological worldview is the main worldview

form in the history of mankind, which remains relevant to this day (neomythology) and can be characterised by the following features:

1) myth – as a basic form of representation of the universe, the world and man;

2) the inseparability of physical and spiritual existence;

3) sacralisation of existence through polytheism;

4) the minimum number of people capable of abstract thinking, analysis, generalisation and synthesis.

In such conditions of existence, when a person's ideas about the Universe, the world and himself/herself are practically not formed, it is impossible to apply the standard epistemological algorithm in full – identification, classification, systematisation. There is too little information, no classification, no concept of the system. The inanimate world is as humanised as possible, because this is the only form of perception currently available to humans. Its world includes gods, kings, heroes, and ordinary people, both free and slave. Nature is an evil, untamed element, from which one can escape only by making sacrifices to the gods. The gods and people are opposed by kings and heroes who change the world through wars and feats.

Wars are deeply heroic. The pinnacle of the development of the mythological type of worldview from the angle of war should probably be considered the figure of Alexander the Great (Iskandar the Two-Horned), which retains its sacredness to this day, especially in the Middle East.

However, civilizational development, once started, did not stop [1–12]. People changed and the world around them changed. The gradual establishment of monotheism led to the first global worldview transformation – the emergence of a religious worldview. A classical religion, monotheism, emerged, which differed sharply from previous pagan cults in its clear prescriptions for all components of life, both physical and spiritual. The place and role of everyone is clearly regulated by sacred texts, and sacrifice to the gods ceases to be a harsh necessity of life. God is love, and one does not kill in the name of God, but lives [1–13].

However, the general understanding and attitude to existence is not dialectical, but metaphysical: everything that exists and happens exclusively by God's will. The term "holy war" takes on a new meaning. Heroic wars turn into religious wars, in which God's providence determines the winner, and this result is used to judge the will of God. All this lasted until the emergence of European humanism, which gradually established a deterministic rather than

a fatalistic concept of existence [1–13]. Protestant ethics gave rise to the spirit of capitalism, and this spectre changed the world more than the spectre of Marx's socialism. This caused a rapid avalanche-like worldview transformation in the major European countries that pioneered capitalist development – the Netherlands, England, France – and a new colonisation of the world in comparison with the old colonial empires – Spain and Portugal – which sincerely believed that the Pope, in the name of God, had secured for them a monopoly on colonising the rest of the world in the form of global Catholic expansion. The law of the negation of worked before it was formulated, and Catholicism gave rise to Protestantism, which won because it did not disappear during the Counter-Reformation [1–13].

Under these conditions, the establishment of a new worldview paradigm – the scientific and philosophical one – was only a matter of time. For the first time, the number of people engaged in intellectual labour and the intellectual resource they produce have become sufficient to maintain the existence of the system [1, 2, 3]. Philosophy is no longer able to accommodate, process and comprehend the entire amount of knowledge that humanity has acquired. Book printing and the emergence of the periodical press have simplified the exchange of information to the point where it is accessible to all. Now the main thing is unhindered access to information, not how to interpret it [1–13].

Science is beginning its triumphant march. Over the two centuries of the eighteenth and nineteenth, the amount of information about the universe, the world, and man that became available for comprehension grew by leaps and bounds. There was a "great information explosion", and the most critical minds among scientists boldly denied the existence of God [1–13]. The triumph of the scientific and philosophical worldview was inevitable. The ghost broke free from the narrow confines of university departments and classrooms and sprouted rapidly in the minds of the masses. A miracle had happened.

There was a paradoxical situation: while Hobbes and Kant were looking for a way to abolish war as a phenomenon in principle, Grotius was laying the foundations of international law of warfare, and Moritz of Orange was developing the foundations of military theory. Then German classical philosophy had its say, arming Clausewitz with the most advanced philosophical methodology of our time. Moltke the Elder is credited with the following remarkable statement: "It is better to be than to appear". Being defined consciousness under Sedan [8–11].

From then on, the war was based on theory and plan. The exploits of mythical heroes were scrupulously analysed by Gibbon, Delbrück and other hypercritics [1–17]. The art of geniuses (Wallenstein, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Charles XII, Napoleon) was replaced by a scientific approach, plan and calculation [1–17]. The prominent British economists D. Ricardo and A. Smith explained to the rest of the world why the British Empire was the most powerful. Meanwhile, on the then margins of civilisation, in the United States, Admiral A. Machen's work was published, which became the cornerstone of a completely new world order [1–17].

In the race of worldviews, the Americans defeated the Europeans by a landslide. The American dream, nurtured in the Wild West, channelled the initiative of the masses in a direction that was most beneficial to society: "If you're so smart, why aren't you so rich?" While Europeans were fighting the ghost of Marx, Americans were conquering the world, because the system of freedom in people's minds is much more attractive than the freedom of the system [1–17].

The current global world architecture, including the security architecture, became possible only as a result of two global defeats in two world wars, the first of which saw monarchical totalitarianism defeated by traditional democracy, and the second saw dictatorial totalitarianism defeated by global democracy [1–17].

In the Cold War, the global idea of democracy won over the global idea of totalitarianism.

However, totalitarianism and fatalism as its basic philosophical idea did not give up. They retreated, repainted themselves, and at the right time rushed back into battle. The global escalation accelerated gradually, and on the morning of 24 February 2022, it moved from a quantitative to a new qualitative level. "If you don't want World War III" in the worst-case nuclear scenario, surrender Ukraine, Taiwan, and Israel. The Munich Agreement of 1938 is being repeated on a global scale [12–18].

Humanity, which had unnoticeably slipped into a worldview neomythology, was not ready for such a turn of events [12–17].

The relatively familiar conventional and hybrid wars have been replaced by a new type of warfare – post-conventional warfare. Post-conventional warfare is a type of warfare that goes beyond traditional (conventional) armed conflicts characterised by open confrontation between regular armies on a clearly defined battlefield. In post-conventional warfare, the emphasis shifts to asymmetry, hybridity, and the use

of information, psychological, and social technologies that affect not only the military but also the political, economic, and cultural aspects of society. This type of war has a deep ideological dimension, as it affects society's perception of war, security and self-determination [15–18].

The main characteristics of the worldview dimension of post-conventional warfare are as follows.

1. Hybridity and multidimensionality of the conflict.

Post-conventional warfare encompasses not only physical space, but also cyberspace, information and ideological dimensions. This requires a rethinking of the traditional concepts of war and peace. Information warfare: influence on the public consciousness through media, social networks, disinformation and propaganda. Cyber threats: attacks on infrastructure, banking systems, and energy, which pose new threats to the security of states [15–18].

2. Change the image of the enemy.

In post-conventional warfare, the enemy often acts through indirect methods, such as supporting terrorist, separatist movements or illegal paramilitary groups. This "unidentified enemy" influences the public outlook, generating fear and instability [15–18].

3. Manipulation of worldview and public consciousness:

– post-conventional wars actively use psychological operations to shape the desired perception of the conflict both inside and outside the country;

– attention is focused on creating certain narratives: justifying aggression, discrediting the enemy, demoralising the population [15–18].

4. Blurred boundaries between war and peace.

Post-conventional war blurs the traditional boundaries between states of peace and war. Society can be in a state of constant conflict at various levels (economic, informational, ideological), which forms new ideas about security [15–18].

5. The value aspect.

Post-conventional war affects the fundamental values of society, such as freedom, sovereignty, human rights and identity. War becomes not only a battle for territory or resources, but also for ideas, cultural models, and political systems.

At the same time, the post-conventional war has given rise to new worldview challenges, including:

a) rethinking the role of the state: in post-conventional wars, the state often loses its monopoly on organising conflict, which requires new approaches to security that include not only military force but also economic, diplomatic, and information mechanisms;

b) information resilience of society: one of the key worldview challenges is the need to develop media literacy, critical thinking and the ability of society to resist information manipulation;

c) identity issues: post-conventional warfare is often aimed at destroying national identity through propaganda, manipulation of historical facts and cultural values, which requires a rethinking of the role of education, culture and historical memory in building a sustainable society;

d) the gap between the traditional and modern perceptions of war: post-conventional warfare changes the usual image of war as an exclusively armed conflict; citizens must adapt to new conditions when war can take place in the form of economic pressure, information aggression or cyber threats.

This approach makes it possible to formulate the following recommendations for adapting society's worldview to post-conventional warfare.

1. Formation of a culture of strategic thinking:

– ensure the implementation of educational programmes that develop the ability to analyse threats, critically evaluate information and form a holistic view of security.

2. Information education:

– develop media literacy to make society resistant to disinformation, fake news and propaganda.

3. Strengthening civic resilience:

– to create an understanding in society of the importance of unity, solidarity and cooperation in the face of hybrid threats.

4. Identity and cultural resilience:

– develop and strengthen national identity through culture, historical memory, language and traditions as important components of countering post-conventional aggression.

5. Civil-military cooperation:

– promote the integration of civilians into national security processes through cooperation programmes between the military and civil society organisations.

Thus, it should be concluded that the ideological dimension of post-conventional warfare is multifaceted, covering both social and cultural and ideological aspects. Adaptation of society to these challenges requires a rethinking of traditional notions of security, war and coexistence in the modern world.

Conclusions

Having considered the issue of justifying the typification of contemporary armed conflicts, the following conclusions can be drawn.

1. Post-conventional warfare is a new paradigm in the development of armed conflicts of our time,

which allows to largely level the ideological systemic limitations inherent in armed conflicts of previous types – non-conventional, conventional and hybrid in nature

2. The characteristic ideological features of post-conventional warfare are: hybridity and multidimensionality of the conflict; changing the image of the enemy; manipulation of worldview and public consciousness; blurred boundaries between war and peace; the value aspect, in which post-conventional war affects the fundamental values of society, becoming not only a battle for territory or resources, but also for ideas, cultural models, and political systems.

3. The development of effective concepts for responding to the ideological challenges posed by post-conventional warfare is a complex and lengthy process for both the international community and the states that have been victims of aggression, and therefore it is important to consider the problems it creates and the ways to respond to them.

Therefore, the prospect of further research is the need to develop scientifically based recommendations for philosophical reflection and response to post-conventional warfare, which should be aimed at fostering a culture of strategic thinking, information education, strengthening civilian resilience, identity and cultural resilience, and civil-military cooperation by promoting the integration of civilians into national security processes through cooperation programmes between the military and civil society organisations.

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ТЕОРЕТИКО-МЕТОДОЛОГІЧНИЙ АНАЛІЗ ОСОБЛИВОСТЕЙ ВПЛИВУ ПОСТКОНВЕНЦІЙНОЇ ВІЙНИ НА СВІТОГЛЯДНИЙ ВИМІР ОСОБИСТОСТІ ВІЙСЬКОВОСЛУЖБОВЦІВ

Нова світоглядна реальність, яка сформувалася внаслідок повномасштабної агресії російської федерації проти української держави, спричинила виникнення війни нового типу – постконвенційної. Це потребує науково-філософського осмислення явища постконвенційної війни, вироблення дієвих концепцій філософської рефлексії та реагування на системні виклики, які вона породжує.

Метою статті є наукове осмислення світоглядної парадигми постконвенційної війни як нової форми збройних конфліктів сучасності, вироблення дієвих концепцій філософської рефлексії та реагування на виклики, які вона створює.

Завдання дослідження полягають у визначенні відмінностей між історичними типами світогляду в умовах постконвенційної війни порівняно з попередніми типами конфліктів (неконвенційними, конвенційними, гібридними), аналізі системних змін у світоглядній практиці й практиці ведення війни, а також у формулюванні способів протидії системним світоглядним викликам, які вона створює для глобальної безпеки.

Методи дослідження охоплюють історико-філософський аналіз розвитку світоглядних концепцій, систематизацію сучасного міжнародного досвіду та аналіз еволюції світоглядного сприйняття війни як об'єктивно існуючого складника буття людини. Також використано порівняльний основний підхід до світоглядного сприйняття війни в інші історичні періоди.

Результати дослідження свідчать, що постконвенційна війна як світоглядне явище відрізняється від попередніх типів збройних конфліктів за такими ознаками: гібридність та багатовимірність конфлікту; зміна образу ворога; маніпуляція світоглядом і суспільною свідомістю; розмитість кордонів між війною та миром; ціннісний аспект, в якому постконвенційна війна зачіпає фундаментальні цінності суспільства, стає не лише битвою за територію чи ресурси, а й за ідеї, культурні моделі, політичні системи.

Дослідження обґрунтовує необхідність використання синтетичних підходів до реагування на сучасні виклики, породжені постконвенційною війною, з урахуванням її комплексного впливу на глобальну світоглядну систему та сприйняття системи міжнародної безпеки.

Ключові слова: філософія, світогляд, постконвенційна війна, світоглядні зміни, світоглядні виклики.

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