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ANALYSIS, PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND JUSTIFICATION OF THE NEED TO CONDUCT A STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR FORMATIONS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD OF UKRAINE DURING ASSIGNED TASKS PERFORMANCE

The authors substantiate the need to study the problems of intelligence support during assigned tasks performance by formations of the National Guard of Ukraine. The main aspects of the organization of intelligence activities, their role in ensuring the effectiveness of operational actions, as well as taking into account the specific conditions and requirements arising in the process of performing tasks by the National Guard of Ukraine are analyzed. The article emphasizes the need for legislative consolidation of the intelligence support functions of the National Guard of Ukraine and the development of modern intelligence methods and tools to enhance operational readiness and ensure security in the context of modern challenges and threats. The recommendations for improving the legal acts of Ukraine and approaches to the organization of intelligence activities are offered, which will allow to increase the effectiveness of the formations of the National Guard of Ukraine in the current or changing conditions.

Keywords: intelligence support of the National Guard of Ukraine, formation, security and defense forces, combat tasks, assigned tasks, latest technologies, legislative regulation, approval.

Statement of the problem. In accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the Law of Ukraine "On the National Guard of Ukraine", the National guard of Ukraine (NGU) participates in cooperation with the Armed Forces of Ukraine in repelling armed aggression against Ukraine and eliminating armed conflict by conducting military (combat) operations, as well as in performing territorial defense tasks [1].

According to paragraphs 2 and 3 of clause 5 of Article 18 of the Law of Ukraine "On National Security of Ukraine", in peacetime, the National Guard of Ukraine is part of the security forces and performs law enforcement functions, as well as develops the capabilities necessary to perform tasks as part of the defense forces [2].

With the introduction of martial law, the NGU is put in readiness to perform assigned tasks under the legal regime of martial law, is a part of the defense forces, performs tasks and is subordinated to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in accordance with the provisions of the

Law of Ukraine "On the Legal Regime of Martial Law of Ukraine" and the Law of Ukraine "On the National Guard of Ukraine", except for military units (subdivisions) that carry out escort and protection of diplomatic missions [2].

Successful assigned task performance and maintaining of combat capability of available forces and means is achieved by implementing a set of measures that are organized and carried out in full regardless of the situation during preparation and directly during assigned tasks performance.

Intelligence support is a key element of the successful performance of combat missions by formations of the NGU, it should be an integral part of the comprehensive support of its forces when used as a component of the state defense forces in order to provide timely intelligence information necessary for the efficient and effective performance of assigned tasks. A full-scale invasion and growing threats, such as terrorism, hybrid warfare and cyberattacks, require

strengthening the intelligence capabilities of formations of the NGU.

However, there are a number of problems related to the organization, management and implementation of intelligence activities, including insufficient cooperation with other structures, limited resources, insufficient integration of the latest technologies, and sometimes insufficient resources (powers) to use advanced technologies.

The lack of a unified concept for the development of intelligence support within the NGU and the low integration of international experience complicate the process of command decision-making and the introduction of new technologies. Thus, there is a need to substantiate the study of these problems, which will allow to develop effective mechanisms for solving them.

Analysis of recent research and publications.

The issue of intelligence support has attracted the attention of many researchers both in Ukraine and abroad. The article by A. O. Danylevskiy [3] analyzes the problems of legal regulation of the NGU's intelligence support. The work of O. V. Kryvenko, Sh. P. Klibanskyi, V. L. Ihnatenko, V. P. Hryniak [4] substantiates the need for intelligence units of military command and control bodies and military units of the National Guard of Ukraine, which, within the limits of their statutory powers, carry out activities for intelligence support of the use of the NGU, and identifies ways to correct the regulatory and legal inconsistencies in such activities.

The article by K. V. Vlasov, R. O. Honchar, and O. Ye. Zabula [5] considers and discusses the development of technical intelligence technology by the units of the National Guard of Ukraine by introducing a systematic method of conducting technical intelligence using unmanned aerial vehicles, which is widely used by defense forces during a full-scale invasion. The publication of R. O. Honchar [6] summarizes and substantiates conceptual approaches to the development of a methodology for the formation of a promising intelligence system of the National Guard of Ukraine, and also reveals the content of approaches to the formation of a promising intelligence system.

The publication by S. S. Hatsenko, O. H. Metalidi, V. P. Dudnyk, M. V. Moroz [7] substantiates recommendations for systematizing the factors that affect the effectiveness of intelligence support of an operational group of troops in an operation based on the analysis of the

experience of the russian-ukrainian war, and proposes approaches to obtaining intelligence from open sources in the interests of intelligence support of a group of troops in operations.

In their study [8], S. S. Hatsenko, O. H. Metalidi, S. O. Bohatyrov, and I. I. Vasyliako, based on the analysis of the experience of conducting integrated intelligence, developed an approach to the integrated use of the available resource of intelligence forces and means in the interests of effective fire damage to the enemy.

The work of Yu. I. Muravska [9] examines the theoretical aspects of the concept of military intelligence, the paradigm of its development in Ukraine, as well as the peculiarities of functioning in the current critical conditions of martial law, which is manifested in the need to build an effective security and defense policy and concerns not only the study of military methods of collecting and processing information, but also, ultimately, the institutional support of military intelligence.

In his article [10], researcher C. Atwood proposes integrated approaches to intelligence support, focusing on the use of automated control systems, analytical platforms, and operational data exchange between different structures. The article [11] emphasizes that at the present stage of warfare, the role and importance of all types of intelligence are significantly increasing, while the russian-Ukrainian war is no exception to this rule, so the Ukrainian military intelligence has broad capabilities to fulfil its mission in modern warfare, which indicates the importance of developing intelligence support in the NGU.

The experience of NATO countries demonstrates the importance of interagency coordination and the use of modern technologies to improve the effectiveness of intelligence activities.

The above-mentioned sources analyze and disclose the issues of information exchange, regulatory and legal support and the use of some advanced technologies. Given the depth of the above materials, there is a need for a comprehensive approach to the study of the problems of intelligence support of formations of the NGU, taking into account current challenges and the specifics of the tasks they perform and determining the need for further research on this issue.

The purpose of the article is to analyze, identify the problems and justify the need to

conduct a study of intelligence support of formations of the National Guard of Ukraine during assigned tasks performance.

Summary of the main material. According to Appendix 2 to the Strategic Defense Bulletin of Ukraine [12], which contains the Matrix of the Main Capabilities of the Defense Forces, paragraph 2 of the National Guard of Ukraine is tasked with implementing intelligence, analytical and strike capabilities by the end of 2025, but according to Article 5 of the Law of Ukraine "On Intelligence", intelligence agencies are:

1) the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine;

2) the intelligence agency of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;

3) the intelligence agency of the central executive body that implements state policy in the field of state border protection.

Intelligence activities other than those provided for in Article 5 [13] by state bodies, military formations, enterprises, institutions, organizations of any form of ownership or individuals are prohibited, except for intelligence activities and special intelligence by other entities of the intelligence community in cases provided for by this Law.

According to subparagraph 4, paragraph 2, Article 4 of the Law of Ukraine "On Intelligence", in order to perform intelligence tasks in Ukraine effectively, the intelligence community operates, whose subjects are and other components of the security and defense sector determined by the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, which are involved by intelligence agencies in performing intelligence tasks and strengthening the state intelligence capabilities, and in accordance with the above-mentioned content of Article 18 of the Law of Ukraine "On National Security of Ukraine", the NGU is this subject.

In his article [3], A. O. Danylevskyi concluded that intelligence activity within the meaning of the Law of Ukraine "On Intelligence" is primarily an activity aimed at obtaining intelligence information on external threats to the national security and defense of Ukraine. It does not include information that can be obtained from open sources through official means and serves to meet the needs of intelligence agencies in areas within their competence.

In the field of military intelligence, intelligence activities are carried out by the intelligence agency

of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) of Ukraine, which conducts these activities in the military sphere, defense, military construction, military-technical and cybersecurity. It is the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine).

At the same time, the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine) is the main management body in the military intelligence system and, within the limits of its powers and in accordance with the procedure established by the Law [13] and acts of the President of Ukraine, coordinates the activities of military intelligence entities and engages certain entities, and in a special period – other components of the defense forces to perform the tasks assigned to such an intelligence body and to carry out the functions defined by the Law of Ukraine "On Intelligence" [13].

Thus, in accordance with the current legislation, during the special period, formations of the National Guard of Ukraine can perform intelligence support tasks independently within their powers and needs, which is logical, since the NGU units need reliable, accurate, complete, up-to-date information to perform their assigned tasks, conduct combat operations and conduct operations. This can be achieved only by directly performing intelligence tasks by their own intelligence agencies and receiving information in the shortest possible time, which affects the efficiency of the formation and the speed of decision-making by the commanders of these formations. After all, even if all formations of the Defense Forces in a certain area are perfectly coordinated, time is still lost in familiarizing themselves with the information received, processing it, entering it into the database system, and drawing conclusions. It is also necessary to take into account the factor that some officials of other formations may consider important information for formations of the NGU to be unimportant due to certain inaccuracies in the data or lack of data from adjacent units that also did not pay attention to certain information and, as a result, will not reflect this important information in their reports.

For a long time, they have been trying to solve this problem in various ways [by creating joint coordination groups (headquarters), exchanging

specialists with related formations], but the most effective and at the same time risky is the creation of closed groups in secure messengers (channels). The risk of information leakage arises when a large number of participants appear and can be added to by anyone. This risk is minimized by strict control, passwords, double verification, and the ability to add participants to a limited number of people.

For a better understanding of the problem of obtaining information by the National Guard of Ukraine (a subject of the intelligence community), it is advisable to cite the arguments and examples used by Cortney Weinbaum and John Shanahan in their article [14], the latter being the Director of Defense Intelligence in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence of the United States of America. They provide examples of information sharing between agencies, which leads to untimely response to emerging threats, namely the scale of information, volume and speed, as well as the ever-increasing complexity of data – diversity and reliability. The challenge is to acquire, manage, fuse, and analyze data across agencies, allies, and partners. In their experience, data is generated in too many different formats, in too many disconnected or inaccessible systems, without standardized structures and without a common agreed-upon ontology. This situation is fraught with wasted data collection, untimely information, missed guidance and alerts, and a lack of relevance for decision-making. The result is an inability to fuse data to create intelligence from multiple sources early in the intelligence cycle and as close to the analytical center as possible. Analysts are left with an overly complex and cumbersome task, with too many obstacles to overcome in order to provide timely and relevant analytical judgments or intelligence to formations and policymakers.

This issue can be resolved by providing the necessary structures with access to the newly received information by the intelligence agency of another interacting structure. In our case, such a method will speed up data processing and allow the analyst [an officer of the formation intelligence department] to better understand the overall picture in the area of operations and anticipate threats to his formation in advance, which once again confirms the need to study and resolve, or rather solve, intelligence support problems during assigned tasks performance by formations of the NGU.

The same conclusion was reached by A. Danylevskyi in his work [3], who, after analyzing the situation, argues that the strategic and operational levels are the prerogative of the relevant intelligence agencies, and intelligence of this level is possible only on their initiative, at the tactical level, in order to ensure their own activities, the NGU units can (and, in the authors' deep conviction, should) conduct intelligence independently. However, for unambiguous understanding and application, this provision should be enshrined in the law.

A similar opinion is shared by R. Honchar, who in his study [6] argues that the organization of interaction with intelligence agencies of the components of the security and defense sector is a problematic issue. The procedure for receiving the intelligence information required by the NGU governing bodies is not detailed in terms of time.

In such circumstances, it is difficult to talk about the effectiveness of the use of units. As rightly noted in scientific papers, in modern conditions, the factor of timely receipt of intelligence information is no less important than damage and maneuver. For the effective use of intelligence on the battlefield, forces and means of destruction are accumulated at a certain time, area and in the required quantity, which makes it possible to achieve an advantage over the enemy. It should be noted that the underutilization of information technology leads to the erroneous accumulation of forces and means, the use of resources and contributes to the loss of initiative and advantage on the battlefield.

Also, one of the main functions assigned to the National Guard of Ukraine is participation in ensuring public security (PS) and public order (PO) during meetings, rallies, marches, demonstrations and other mass events that pose a danger to the life and health of citizens [1]. Each of these events can escalate into mass riots, which, in turn, will lead to a complication of the situation in the area where units of the NGU are performing their tasks. According to the Law [1], the National Guard of Ukraine is the main entity responsible for suppressing mass disorder. As a rule, the NGU operates in cooperation with other law enforcement agencies and state and local authorities, from which it receives information about the state and changes in the situation in the area of operations. However, this information almost always has different degrees of confidentiality, which complicates its

exchange between the forces involved in the protection of public safety and security during mass events and the suppression of mass disorder [15]. The exchange of information is complicated by difficult conditions, lack of technical means, poorly organized interaction between agencies and the reluctance of some leaders to share this information and make unnecessary "moves". Once again, while performing their assigned tasks, formations of the NGU face the problem of obtaining and processing information, since, despite having their own intelligence units, their use in the performance of law enforcement functions is limited by the current legislation of Ukraine. To eliminate this discrepancy, an order was issued by the Commander of the National Guard of Ukraine, which partially solved the problem, as it regulates the activities of formations of the NGU during the public order protection and ensuring public security and does not oblige or encourage other structures of the security forces of Ukraine to fulfill the tasks of collecting, processing and analyzing information in good faith, and most importantly, to timely transfer information to the operational headquarters for timely response to changes in the situation and timely and informed decision-making.

Analysis of the current legislation, scientific works and the procedure for conducting intelligence by the National Guard of Ukraine makes it possible to identify the following main problems of intelligence support of the NGU.

1. Lack of legislatively enshrined powers for the National Guard of Ukraine to conduct intelligence independently in peacetime. The NGU formations have the right to conduct intelligence in a special period in the field of military intelligence only on behalf of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (Defence Intelligence of Ukraine), and independently to meet their own needs – only at the tactical level, which limits their awareness of the situation in the area of operations.

2. The lack of a legislative procedure for the exchange of intelligence information between the intelligence agencies of the security and defense forces that is clearly regulated in terms of time leads to the receipt of irrelevant information or its untimely processing, the possibility of duplication of efforts, loss of time, and discrepancies in data that can negatively affect operational decisions.

3. Insufficient use of modern technologies. The intelligence units of the NGU often use outdated methods of collecting and analyzing information, which limits their real-time capabilities, as only organizations specified in legislative acts can access advanced closed technologies. This problem leads to a loss of efficiency, data accuracy, inability to respond to rapid changes in the situation, and lack of critical information about threats.

4. The low level of training of intelligence personnel, which is the result of insufficient training in the use of new technologies, data analysis and work with modern information systems. This problem further leads to a decrease in the effectiveness of intelligence tasks, the risk of erroneous conclusions or a slowdown in the process of analyzing information. This is caused by the lack of specialized courses for the National Guard of Ukraine on the use of artificial intelligence, intelligence software, and the low percentage of NGU servicemen who attend courses abroad.

5. Limited resources for technical equipment due to insufficient funding or delays in providing modern technical means, such as drones, sensors, information collection systems, which leads to the inability to effectively perform tasks in difficult conditions, such as combat operations or monitoring in hard-to-reach areas (cities).

6. Slow adaptation to new challenges. Due to insufficient manning and constant involvement of formations of the NGU in assigned tasks, intelligence units do not always have time to train and study technologies in a calm environment. As a result, they have to adapt their methods and strategies to changes in the combat zone or changes in the foreign policy situation. This problem increases the vulnerability to new forms of hybrid threats, such as cyberattacks or information warfare, and when intelligence units perform their intended tasks, it leads to the inability to use technology or even loss of technology. An example is the lack of attention to collecting intelligence in cyberspace or monitoring social media, which is relevant in the area of operations.

7. Low efficiency or sometimes lack of joint teams with specialists in different areas. Intelligence officers, analysts, technologists, and cyber specialists work in isolation, which makes it difficult to integrate and share knowledge, leading to a loss of synergy between different areas of intelligence, which reduces the effectiveness

of analysis and decision-making. This problem arises due to the lack of joint operational centers (groups) that could combine different specializations.

8. Instability of information support. The system of collecting, analyzing and storing data is underdeveloped, which can cause information leaks or loss of relevance, leading to an increased risk of compromising intelligence and can be used by the enemy. This problem arises due to unreliable communication channels or lack of cyber security in intelligence support systems and, again, due to the low availability of advanced technologies and communications

The above-mentioned problems require an immediate study of intelligence support in assigned tasks performance by formations of the National Guard of Ukraine and the creation of an up-to-date method for assessing the intelligence support capability of formations of the NGU in the performance of state security tasks, which will provide assistance and support to officials responsible for and directly preparing intelligence agencies for assigned tasks.

In the course of developing this method, it is planned to maintain constant contact with higher military educational institutions of other formations that are part of the security and defense forces of Ukraine and are engaged in intelligence support. Particular attention will be paid to the formations of the National Guard of Ukraine that directly perform assigned tasks as part of the state defense forces. It is advisable to conduct a practical approval of the obtained scientific results.

Conclusions

The existing intelligence system of the National Guard of Ukraine is able to provide command and control bodies and commanders with the necessary intelligence information only to a limited extent. To improve the effectiveness of intelligence support of formations of the National Guard of Ukraine, it is necessary to eliminate the previously mentioned problems of the existing system and develop a method for assessing the intelligence support capability of formations of the National Guard of Ukraine during the performance of tasks to ensure state security, since it is precisely on the promptness of receipt of reliable and up-to-date information that the timeliness and expediency of decision-making by commanders on the ground

and the subsequent fulfilment of the task and, most importantly, the saving of the lives and health of, first of all, citizens of Ukraine, servicemen of the National Guard of Ukraine and all other security and defense forces of Ukraine.

Further research and development are planned to improve the effectiveness of intelligence support of the National Guard of Ukraine:

- hypotheses and logic of the study of the intelligence support of the National Guard of Ukraine on state security tasks performance, as well as effective mechanisms for their solution;
- submission of proposals and mechanisms for solving the problems of intelligence support of the National Guard of Ukraine;
- practical assessment of the intelligence support capabilities of the National Guard of Ukraine in state security tasks performance.

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**АНАЛІЗ, ВИЗНАЧЕННЯ ПРОБЛЕМ ТА ОБҐРУНТУВАННЯ НЕОБХІДНОСТІ
ПРОВЕДЕННЯ ДОСЛІДЖЕННЯ РОЗВІДУВАЛЬНОГО ЗАБЕЗПЕЧЕННЯ
ФОРМУВАНЬ НАЦІОНАЛЬНОЇ ГВАРДІЇ УКРАЇНИ
ПІД ЧАС ВИКОНАННЯ ЗАВДАНЬ ЗА ПРИЗНАЧЕННЯМ**

Обґрунтовано необхідність дослідження проблем розвідувального забезпечення під час виконання завдань за призначенням формуваннями Національної гвардії України.

Проаналізовано основні аспекти організації розвідувальної діяльності, її роль у забезпеченні ефективності оперативних дій, а також ураховано конкретні умови та вимоги, що виникають у процесі виконання завдань Національної гвардії України. Зокрема, наголошено на необхідності законодавчого закріплення функцій розвідувального забезпечення, розвитку сучасних методів і засобів розвідки для підвищення оперативної готовності та забезпечення безпеки в умовах сучасних викликів і загроз.

Запропоновано рекомендації щодо вдосконалення нормативно-правових актів України, підходів до організації розвідувальної діяльності, що дасть змогу підвищити ефективність діяльності формувань Національної гвардії України в умовах, які склалися або змінюються.

Ключові слова: *розвідувальне забезпечення Національної гвардії України, формування, сили безпеки і оборони, бойові завдання, завдання за призначенням, новітні технології, законодавче регулювання, затвердження.*

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