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CONCEPTUAL PRINCIPLES FOR PLANNING AND CONDUCTING LAND OPERATIONS ACCORDING TO NATO STANDARDS

Based on the analysis of the current NATO doctrine on land operations, as well as other guiding publications, the ideas, principles and basic concepts used in military management in the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance are systematized. The interpretation into Ukrainian military terminology reveals the main ideas and principles of the concepts of Command and Control, Manoeuvring Approach, philosophy of decentralized (targeted) command (Mission command), as well as requirements for planning land operations. It is emphasized that the principles of warfare, operations, and combat are the most significant non-physical factor influencing the success of operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Keywords: conceptual framework, land operation, principles, maneuver approach, decentralized management.

Statement of the problem. The full-scale armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine has shown that the use of the principles of command and control of troops according to NATO standards not only increases combat effectiveness, but is also currently a key condition for achieving victory over the aggressor. The saying about a small Soviet army that will never defeat a large Soviet army has long become a meme. The victories of the Ukrainian defense forces on the battlefield in 2022 showed that the strength of the Ukrainian troops at that time was the ability to maneuver, which preserved their combat power and inflicted asymmetric damage on the aggressor, reducing its potential and morale. Success is achieved by those commanders who act actively, pragmatically and non-standardly in the interests of completing a combat mission, relying mostly on the real situation, experience and common sense, rather than on the detailed plans of senior commanders.

This approach to conducting ground operations is possible when senior commanders, at a psychological level, positively perceive and actively implement concepts, principles, and relationships in the military sphere that are built not on the philosophy of carrying out orders at any cost, but on the philosophy of achieving the goal. Operations, when lower and middle level commanders are motivated to take the initiative to

create the desired end state specified in the operation order.

In the context of the topic of the article, it is important to note that the philosophy of achieving the goal is embedded in the Western paradigm of NATO military standards as a number of key principles, terminology, operational art, tactics, methods and procedures, as well as the culture of military personnel relations (horizontally and vertically). In this paradigm, orderly initiative and independence of management bodies at all levels prevail when making management decisions, and at the same time the use of an authoritarian (Soviet) leadership style is nullified.

In addition, it is obvious that in order to gain an advantage over the enemy, commanders of all levels need to get rid of the unwritten, but, unfortunately, persistent worst principles, which are actually destructive for the defense forces of Ukraine and, perhaps, the main intangible factor affecting the loss of trust in commanders and in the most valuable resource – motivated infantry. Such unwritten "principles" are: do not do what is more efficient, but as the boss ordered; report only good news to the senior boss; do not ask questions and do not highlight problems; your career growth is determined by personal devotion to the boss, not professionalism; initiative "beats" the initiator, etc.

In the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, the term "*doctrine*" is interpreted as the basic

principles, which military forces adhere to in their actions in the interests of achieving objectives. Military personnel are required to understand the purpose of these principles, the overall concept (philosophy), in order to guide their thinking when using them [1, 2]. The US Army FM 3-0 Operations combat manual states that the principles of warfare, operations, and combat actions (hereinafter referred to as the principles of war) are the most significant non-physical factor that influences the success of operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels [1].

Thus, the innovative approach to conducting land operations is largely related to the implementation of NATO doctrinal principles at the mental level in the activities of the Ukrainian defense forces. The relevance of their implementation is enhanced by the understanding that the physical existence of a sovereign Ukraine is possible only in an alliance with European and Western countries.

Analysis of recent research and publications.

A review of recent publications in the field of military management gives grounds to assert that the main ideas and principles of planning and conducting operations according to Euro-Atlantic standards in the Ukrainian information field are not presented sufficiently thoroughly for their popularization and implementation at the procedural and psychological levels in the defense forces. This article is a logical continuation and addition to the solution of the problems highlighted in the publications [3, 4], which formed the content and revealed the system of basic terms of command and control of troops (forces) according to NATO standards, and investigated the essence, content and key ideas of the maneuver approach, which is currently considered a modern and leading concept of asymmetric NATO land operations. In article [5], the assessment of operations was considered as an important procedure for measuring the progress of actions in accordance with the requirements of NATO member states. In this area, due to the high-quality provision of semantic interoperability, articles [6] and [7] attract attention, among others, in which some important principles, concepts and notions of doctrinal support for the armed forces of NATO member states are interpreted, and methods of planning military actions adopted by NATO are also presented.

However, the aforementioned scientific works did not aim to systematize and specify in detail the

conceptual principles of command and control according to the standards of partner countries.

The purpose of the article is to create prerequisites for increasing the effectiveness of planning and conducting operations by the Ukrainian Defense Forces by defining the content and systematizing the ideas, principles, and basic concepts used in military management in the North Atlantic Alliance countries, and their popularization in military management bodies.

Summary of the main material. In the context of the article, the term "conceptual principles" will be understood as the initial main provisions (ideas) and principles on which the art of war is based.

A review of NATO and US Army publications in the field of military command [1, 8–11] allowed us to outline a structural diagram of key conceptual principles, which can be presented in the form of Figure 1.

Principles of operations

Army operations were first published after World War I. Since then, only minor changes have been made based on analytical, practical data, and experience, and are currently used at all levels of command in the armies of NATO member states. In different publications, these principles may have different sequences and minor differences in interpretation. However, their basic content remains essentially unchanged [1, 8].

1. *Focus – Direct each military operation toward a clearly defined primary objective that is realistically achievable*. Clearly defined objectives specify what subordinates must accomplish, focusing on the result rather than the means to achieve it. Commanders at all levels must have the same understanding of the expected result (desired end state).

2. *Maintaining morale – develop and maintain in every way the will necessary to achieve the desired strategic end state*. The movement towards it may take years. However, patient, determined and persistent pursuit of national goals is a necessary factor in success. Morale is based on the support of the army by society and the trust of subordinates in their commanders.

3. *Offensive action – seize, hold and use the initiative*. Offensive action is identified with the concept of initiative, as seizing, holding and using the initiative are crucial for freedom of action and timely response to unexpected developments.




Figure 1– Flowchart of key conceptual frameworks (version)

4. *Concentration of effort (massing)* – Concentrate (mass) combat power in the right place and time. Commanders mass combat power in time and space. Massing in time means applying combat power elements simultaneously at several decisive points, while massing in space means applying combat power elements simultaneously at a single decisive point. Both types of massing contribute to success.

5. *Conserve forces* – allocate the minimum amount of forces and assets for the supporting strike. Conserve forces is the opposite of massing. Commanders commit the minimum amount of combat power to support forming operations so that they can focus on the decisive one.

6. *Maneuver (flexibility)* – Force the enemy into a disadvantageous position by using the flexibility of the application of combat power. Maneuver is a complex concept, more than firepower or movement. It is based on situational awareness and encompasses the flexible planning and dynamic management of the application of all other elements of combat power: reconnaissance, firepower, protection, and logistics. Thus, maneuver includes and complements firepower.

7. *Unity of Command and Unity of Leadership* – Use unity of action under the leadership of a single responsible commander to achieve each objective. Unity of command means that one commander directs and coordinates the actions of all forces to achieve a common goal.

8. *Security* – never let the enemy gain a sudden advantage. A constantly operating surveillance system and stealth are the keys to security.

9. *Suddenness* – strike at a time, in a way, and in a place when and where the enemy is not ready. Suddenness is an action that is the opposite of security. This factor is most conducive to achieving the shock effect. It is a powerful, but temporary, factor in increasing combat capability. The key factors of suddenness are speed, stealth, and asymmetric actions.

10. *Simplicity* – Plans and orders should be simple and unambiguous. Simple plans, as well as clear and concise orders, reduce the likelihood of misunderstanding and confusion.

Operational principles, based on the experience of past campaigns, operations, battles, and engagements, are powerful analytical tools. However, they are applied situationally. Their greatest value lies in the training of officers and NCOs.

Ideas and principles of command

According to NATO standard [2, 9, 10] command and control (Command and Control) is the exercise of authority and leadership by a duly authorized commander over subordinate and attached forces to accomplish a given combat mission. In the concept of Command and Control and its components – Command and Control – are interdependent, but have different meanings and are divided into components and elements, as shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2 – Components and elements of command

Command is the exercise of legitimate authority (power) that commanders have over their subordinates in accordance with their military ranks and positions. This concept includes: responsibility for the proper use of available resources; planning the use of military force; organizing management, coordination and control over the implementation of assigned tasks; responsibility for the health, well-being, morale and discipline of subordinate personnel. Command is a personal function and concerns the commander, who focuses more on aspects of the art of warfare (but not the science), such as the impact of leadership on combat capabilities and uncertainties regarding the enemy.

Command is based on the following principles: combination of efforts (to fulfill the mission and the commander's intent); decentralization of execution; mutual trust; timeliness and effectiveness of decisions and actions.

Two concepts (types) of command are used in NATO member states (Figure 3): detailed command (detailed command); decentralized (targeted) command (mission) command).

Detailed command is characterized by the fact that the senior commander determines the course of action of subordinate commanders and accordingly limits their initiative. In practice, detailed command can be used, for example, if junior commanders are insufficiently trained or when several units operate in a cluster and tight coordination is required.

The main concept is *decentralized command*, which is based on the philosophy of achieving the goal of the operation, when lower and middle-level commanders not only have the opportunity, but are obliged to show initiative and independence when choosing ways to achieve the goal of the operation and the desired end state determined by the senior

commander. Decentralized command is so important that the term Mission command in publications of the US Army Ground Forces has now replaced the term Command and Control.

Control in the Command concept and Control determines the procedure and organization of military operations management, the execution of tasks in accordance with the commander's plan. It includes the collection, processing, display, storage and dissemination of information to create a general operational picture and the use of information in the process of conducting operations. Unlike command, management is a collective function, which is jointly carried out by commanders and staffs.

Management requires an understanding of those aspects of operations that can be analyzed and measured, while it is necessary to rely on objectivity, facts, empirical methods, detailed consideration and realistic assessments of one's own and enemy capabilities of organizations and systems, as well as time-distance and readiness time factors. On this basis, management is considered to be a science to a greater extent. The science of management includes tactics, methods and procedures (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures – TTR), as well as military (operational) terminology and graphics (Operation Terms and Graphics).

Commanders use two types (methods) of control (Figure 3): Procedural control; administrative (in the US Army – constructive) management (Positive Control). They choose the more appropriate method given the situation.




Figure 3 – Types of command and control by degree of centralization

Procedural control is a method of command that relies on a combination of orders and instructions, as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). This type of control requires no intervention from senior commanders once it is established. This method can be effective when a unit operates in isolation from the main force, largely autonomously and independently, such as when performing stabilization operations or conducting defensive combat in a separate cell.

Disciplinary command is a method of commanding forces that encourages senior commanders to actively assess, make decisions, and direct their implementation. It may be appropriate when detailed direction is needed for a series of sequential actions.

Management is based on the following principles: with comprehensibility and timeliness; clarity and conciseness; the importance of staff training; the priority of the result over the process; a single understanding of the plan.

Key ideas and planning principles

The basic requirements for planning military operations are set out in NATO and US Army publications [1, 9, 10, 11]. When interpreted in Ukrainian military terminology, they can be interpreted in the following generalized form.

Planning is the art and science of understanding the situation, envisioning a desired future, and developing a course of action to achieve that future. Essentially, it is a continuous, cyclical process by which appropriate officials translate the commander's visualization of the situation into a specific course of action, focusing on the expected

results and coordination of subordinates in each phase of the operation.

The product of planning is a plan or order. Any plan is only a basic structure that can be adapted, not a script that must be followed literally. Plans and orders that encourage initiative and provide sufficient coordination of the actions of the executors are considered effective.

Effective planning requires thoroughness, awareness, and appropriate practical skills. Those involved in planning must be technically and tactically competent, use doctrinal terms and symbols correctly, and understand the principles of planning.

The planning principles that contribute to its effectiveness are as follows:

- 1) the commander is the central planning figure;
- 2) commanders plan all full-spectrum operations;
- 3) commanders constantly check the validity of assumptions;
- 4) planning is continuous;
- 5) planning is time-sensitive;
- 6) simple and flexible plans are more effective;
- 7) commanders avoid planning "traps".

The essence of the first principle is that planning is a commander's function and a primary tool of command. Commanders are the most important participants in the planning process, as they usually have the most experience and are ultimately responsible for executing plans. Commanders provide approaches to planning that meet the requirements of time, simplicity, and level of detail. They ensure that it is reasonable, realistic, and in compliance with legal requirements.

The second principle is the commanders' awareness that the intent of each individual operation (action) is an integral part of another (higher order).

According to *the third principle*, the commander and his subordinates collect facts on the basis of which they make assumptions and use them during planning. Facts are what is reliably known about its existence. Facts form the basis for understanding the situation in the planning process. Assumptions are mandatory and important for planning. This is a hypothesis about the current situation or about the future development of events, which is considered correct when there is no evidence to the contrary. They should be logical, realistic and not based on superstition, bias, false historical analogies or wishful thinking. If at least one key assumption turns out to be wrong, then the headquarters must adjust the plan of action. Excess assumptions leads to an increase in the inadequacy of the decision to the situation, but an unstated assumption can be more dangerous than a stated incorrect assumption.

The fourth principle states that planning does not stop even after the order to action is given and continues throughout the entire process of conducting operations. In conditions of changeability, accurate forecasting is unlikely: while the solution to the problem is being developed, the problem itself is changing. Continuity of planning allows officials to adjust the plan of action and the expected results.

The fifth principle focuses on the criticality of time in operations. In allocating time, commanders must ensure that their subordinates have sufficient time to plan and prepare their actions. A timely plan is one that is issued quickly enough to allow subordinates sufficient time to plan, formulate a mission, and prepare for action. In allocating the time available for operational preparation, commanders and staffs follow the "one-third to two-thirds" rule. They use one-third of the available time for their own planning and allocate the remaining two-thirds to their subordinates for their planning and preparation. To optimize time and ensure better interaction, commanders use joint or parallel planning.

Collaborative planning is the exchange of information, knowledge, insights, ideas, and concepts between echelon commanders, subordinate commanders, headquarters, and other partners regardless of their physical location in the planning process. Multiple echelons develop their plans simultaneously.

Parallel planning means that two or more echelons carry out the planning process for the same operation almost simultaneously, and subordinate units do not wait for an order from a higher headquarters to begin developing their own plans and orders. The higher headquarters continuously exchanges information with subordinates regarding upcoming operations.

The sixth principle indicates that simple and flexible plans are more effective. Simplicity is one of the main principles of warfare. This is facilitated by short plans that are easier to distribute, read, and remember. Commanders should give clear and understandable orders, using correct terminology and graphics, minimizing detail where possible. In contrast, complex plans require complex coordination, which significantly increases risks. After all, the more detailed the plan, the more likely it is that it will not be adequate for a rapidly changing situation. However, it is necessary to realize that simple plans are not simplistic, since simplification means ignoring the complexity of the situation.

The flexibility of plans is characterized by the "built-in" space for the initiative of subordinates. In the armies of Western countries, preference is given to the so-called Mission-type orders. A task order is a conceptual approach to developing orders that focuses subordinates on the results to be achieved, rather than how they should achieve them. Task orders contain all the components of a task definition (who, what, when, where, and why). They should be at a minimum level of detail that does not constrain subordinates' freedom and initiative while still providing leadership. Reducing risk also makes plans more flexible. For example, maintaining a reserve of attack drones on the defensive can reduce the requirements for building a forward edge and, in addition, neutralize an enemy breakthrough.

The seventh principle aims to protect the commander from errors in planning approaches – the planning "traps". There are four planning "traps" that commanders should avoid, namely:

- the desire to overly expand the planning horizon (as a result of the mistaken belief that a plan can guide the development of events and that the future is a linear continuation of the present);
- excessive detailing of plans (neglecting the rule "the less known about the situation, the less details the plan should contain");
- focusing efforts on fulfilling the requirements of the plan despite the changed situation;
- the practice of using inflexible planning methods that lead to stereotyped or overly

structured thinking, too rigid adherence to established procedures and standards.

Thus, the cyclical process of planning is more important than following plans in operations. It helps commanders understand problems and develop solutions to solve them. Planning keeps troops focused on creating the desired end conditions specified in the commander's intent, despite the complexity, variability, and contradictions of the current situation. Effective plans are those that encourage initiative and coordinate action. According to the authors of the article, it would be appropriate to recall the famous saying of D. Eisenhower, an American military and statesman: "A plan is nothing, planning is everything. Your plans are outdated as soon as you leave the room. But during planning, your team will rally, and if you encounter unexpected difficulties, your people will know how to overcome them".

The main provisions of the maneuvering approach concept

The current NATO doctrine on land operations [9, 10] (hereinafter referred to as the Doctrine) states that NATO Joint Forces usually involve land, sea, air, aerospace components (forces) and special forces to conduct a military campaign, which are coordinated according to a single plan. Land operations (as elements of a military campaign) are conducted with the aim of capturing and holding certain territories, controlling and protecting the population, usually for a long time. Land forces operate in an environment that is unpredictable, complex, dynamic and antagonistic. As K. von Clausewitz noted, war takes place in an environment consisting of danger, physical overload, uncertainty and randomness. Everything in war is simple, but even the simplest thing becomes complicated because it is overgrown with countless small and unpredictable circumstances and uncertainties that arise by chance and inevitably accompany real war, as opposed to war that is laid out on paper and in plans [12].

Thus, chaos and uncertainty dominate ground operations, which is why they are fundamentally different from operations in other environments (air, space, sea). Accordingly, the management and organization of ground forces are also fundamentally different from others. Prediction is an exceptional phenomenon that reduces the effectiveness of centralized decision-making and the process of giving detailed orders.

To minimize the impact of uncertainty and variability of the situation, the current Doctrine

defines a number of provisions, including the following:

- when taking action, one must rely primarily on principles, not on orders;
- plans should be simple and clear, without excessive detail, focusing on the main elements of the operation;
- a necessary condition for success in operations is the ability to take risks, but the risk must be calculated and managed;
- in operations, a certain course of action may not work, so to achieve a result, you need to rely more on experience, pragmatism, and common sense than on plans.

The Doctrine is dominated by the concept of a maneuverable approach, which is based on the following basic principles [9]:

- mission command;
- a combination of lethal and non-lethal means of influence (attacks) not so much on the physical (material) component of the enemy, but on his understanding, cohesion, and will to resist;
- identifying the enemy's vulnerable spots and suddenly applying a point blow with the aim of disorganizing the enemy;
- seizing, maintaining, and developing the initiative by applying decisive pressure in places where the enemy least expects it.

Maneuver planning emphasizes situational awareness and manipulation of human nature, exploiting the enemy's vulnerabilities, employing indirect and original methods of action, and minimizing casualties. This approach offers quick results or results that are significantly greater than the resources employed, making it attractive to a numerically weaker side or a side that wants to minimize the amount of resources employed.

The concept of a maneuverable approach is based on the ideas and principles of mission command.

Mission philosophy command

In a broad sense, mission Command (hereinafter referred to as MC) is a philosophy of military operations management, based on taking into account the human factor in the conditions of variability and chaos that are natural for ground operations. The person is put in a prominent place, since he is required to use all moral and physical forces [9]. MC has been implemented and developed in NATO countries for a long time. In a narrow (purely practical) sense, MC is defined as a command principle that supports a centralized clear plan with decentralized execution [1, 9].

Historically, the prototype of the MS is the Prussian-German doctrinal development (during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870) *Auftragstaktik* – Tactics of achieving goals (as opposed to "tactics of carrying out orders"), which was implemented in the 1920s as a military reform by G. von Seeckt. He was a German statesman and politician, a veteran of the First World War, Chief of the General Staff of the Imperial German Army, who went down in history as a reformer and founder of the German armed forces after the First World War. He saw the inefficiency of positional confrontation between groups of troops and, conversely, the success of the use of "assault squad tactics", when sufficiently trained grassroots commanders (within the framework of a combat mission) acted independently, showing initiative. The objective prerequisite for the implementation of *Auftragstaktik* was the requirement of the Treaty of Versailles to limit the size of the German army (no more than 100,000 people, including 4,000 officers). According to G. von Seeck, a small professional army would be much better to manage than a massive one, and maneuver should become a full-fledged method of war (it would not be an exaggeration to assume that during the time of Nazi Germany this method, combined with A. Schlieffen's plan, was transformed into the blitzkrieg strategy). Every officer, sergeant and private had to be able to manage at least one level higher. Sergeants were able to command companies (their number was not limited by the terms of the treaty and by 1926 had increased to 57,000 people). In fact, G. von Seeck managed to create an "army of officers" – the backbone of the future infamous Hitlerite Wehrmacht [13].

The appeal to historical facts is made in order to emphasize the necessary and main condition for the effective implementation of the MC – the involvement of competence and high professionalism of the command staff at all levels of management.

The main ideas and principles of the MC were formulated against the background of publications by NATO and the US Army [1, 8–11].

1. Special requirements for commanders; their ability to make independent decisions. The variability of the situation and the unpredictability of the development of situations that characterize land operations place special requirements on commanders at all levels, the most important of which is the ability to make independent decisions. Only prudent, insightful and far-sighted

commanders are able to independently make bold decisions and implement them decisively.

2. Ordered freedom of action and initiative in accordance with the commander's intention. An important condition for independent decision-making is freedom of action, which the commander must give to his subordinates, if this does not harm his intention, since the commander's intention should not depend on the decisions of his subordinates, and the commander is responsible for his subordinates. Comprehensive control of subordinates is impossible and undesirable. Decentralized command assumes that initiative can not only be allowed, but must be demanded from everyone. Indecision and inaction are incomparably more destructive in ground operations than the wrong choice of a way to achieve the goal. Accordingly, the commander must realize that the punishment for inaction in battle will be harsher than an erroneous decision. At the same time, initiative cannot be allowed if the command staff does not have a single understanding of tactics and operational art, and if the command staff is not informed about the intention of the senior commander or does not understand it.

3. Trust and coherence. The dominant factor for the effective use of decentralized control is trust between personnel "vertically and horizontally". Trust arises from shared views on operational art, tactics, management and respect for competence. Mutual trust can be achieved through joint training, exercises, in which commanders gain mutual understanding, a common terminology and coherence in actions.

4. Effective plans stimulate initiative.

5. Giving orders in Mission-type form orders.

The last two provisions have already been discussed in detail in the article.

Conclusions

The key intangible condition for victory over a numerically superior enemy is the avoidance and eradication of the shortcomings of the totalitarian Soviet concept of military command: with excessive centralization of decision-making; with rejection of critical assessments, when actions are allowed only if they are clearly authorized; creative operational thinking is often replaced by supposedly scientifically based templates; the authoritarian powers of the commander are often not balanced by individual responsibility, and career success is based on loyalty and personal "devotion" to the superior (commander) and only as an exception – on

professional competence. Post-soviet approaches to management reject officers with critical and creative thinking.

Western (North Atlantic) concepts are based on the principles of decentralized management (mission command), using a creative approach, when leaders (commanders) and subordinates at all levels apply orderly initiative, delegation of authority, are guided primarily by the situation (rather than rigidly adhering to the plan and order), actively, pragmatically and non-standardly act in the interests of fulfilling the commander's intention and the mission. An effective officer must have professional competence, initiative and prudence, critical and creative thinking, the ability to quickly adapt to changing circumstances, cooperate in a team and have the moral courage to bring both good and bad aspects to the commander.

To minimize the impact of uncertainty and variability of the situation, the current NATO doctrine regarding land operations has defined a number of provisions, including the following: during actions, rely primarily on principles, not orders; plans should be simple and clear, without excessive detail, focusing on the main elements of the operation; a necessary condition for success in operations is the ability to take risks, which must be justified (calculated and managed); in operations, a specific plan may turn out to be ineffective, therefore, to achieve a result, it is necessary to rely more on experience, pragmatism and common sense than on plans.

The direction of further research may be the identification and systematization of useful techniques and procedures defined by the standards of partner countries.

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КОНЦЕПТУАЛЬНІ ЗАСАДИ ПЛАНУВАННЯ І ВЕДЕННЯ СУХОПУТНИХ ОПЕРАЦІЙ ЗА СТАНДАРТАМИ НАТО

На основі аналізу сучасної доктрини НАТО стосовно сухопутних операцій, а також інших керівних публікацій систематизовано ідеї, принципи та базові поняття, що застосовуються у військовому управлінні у державах Північноатлантичного альянсу. В інтерпретації до української воєнної термінології розкрито основні ідеї та принципи концепцій Command and Control, Manoeuvrist approach, Mission command, а також вимоги до планування сухопутних операцій.

Наголошено, що принципи ведення війни, операцій та бойових дій є найбільш вагомим нефізичним чинником, що впливає на успіх операцій на стратегічному, оперативному та тактичному рівнях.

У керівних публікаціях держав-членів НАТО Command and Control розкривається як поняття складне і таке, що відображує, з одного боку, істотні відмінні ознаки системи мислення та діяльності командирів, а з іншого – системи роботи штабів усіх ланок управління.

Показано, що циклічний процес планування є важливішим за дотримання планів в операціях. Він допомагає командирам зрозуміти проблеми і виробити рішення щодо їх розв'язання. Планування підтримує війська такими, що орієнтовані на створення бажаних кінцевих умов, визначених у намірі командира, незважаючи на складність, мінливість та суперечливість поточної обстановки. Ефективними є плани, що спонукають до ініціативи і координують дії.

У статті концепція Manoeuvrist approach подається як ключова концепція сучасної західної доктрини сухопутних операцій, яка ставить на перший план розуміння ситуації і маніпулювання людською природою, використання уразливих сторін противника, застосування непрямих і оригінальних способів дій та мінімізацію втрат. Цей підхід пропонує швидкі результати або результати значно більші, ніж застосовані ресурси, тому він є привабливим для слабшої сторони в кількісному відношенні. Він ґрунтується на філософії Mission command.

Були сформульовані й інтерпретовані до української воєнної лексики основні ідеї та принципи Mission command, а саме: особливі вимоги до командирів; їхня спроможність приймати самостійні рішення; упорядкована свобода дій та ініціатива, що спираються на commander's intent; довіра і злагожденість; ефективні плани, що стимулюють ініціативу; віддання наказів у формі Mission-type orders.

У висновку зазначено, що ключовою нематеріальною умовою перемоги над кількісно переважаючим противником є уникнення і викорінювання недоліків тоталітарної радянської концепції управління військами. Ця концепція є надмірно централізованою, коли дії допускаються лише в тому разі, якщо вони санкціоновані. Креативне оперативне мислення підміняється шаблонами, авторитарні повноваження командира не врівноважені індивідуальною відповідальністю, критичні оцінки є неприйнятними, а успішність кар'єри ґрунтується на лояльності та особистій «відданості» начальникові (командирові) і лише як виняток – на професійній компетентності. Пострадянські підходи до управління відторгають офіцерів з критичним і креативним мисленням.

Ключові слова: концептуальні засади, сухопутна операція, принципи, маневрений підхід, децентралізоване управління.

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