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## PROBLEMS AND DIRECTIONS FOR IMPROVING TACTICAL-SPECIAL TRAINING OF NATIONAL GUARD OF UKRAINE UNITS IN COUNTERING ENEMY RECONNAISSANCE AND SABOTAGE GROUPS UNDER MARTIAL LAW

*The article examines the improvement of tactical-special training for servicemen of the National Guard of Ukraine to effectively counter reconnaissance and sabotage groups under martial law. Based on the analysis of international humanitarian law and national legislation, the hierarchical structure of enemy formations is revealed, and lists of objects subject to protection or potential targets during conflict are systematized. The study of U.S. and German military doctrines allowed for the adaptation of international experience in defensive combat, focused on exhausting the enemy and creating conditions for a counteroffensive. Particular attention is paid to identifying russian reconnaissance and sabotage groups by signs of intelligence activities, covert destabilization of the sociopolitical situation, and information-based discredit of state authorities.*

*Tactical methods of counter-sabotage operations in border areas are detailed, specifically the experience of using ambushes by the security and defense forces of Ukraine. The scientific novelty lies in the development and justification of a sabotage protection model for implementation in the educational process of higher education institutions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine. The proposed model provides a comprehensive two-stage training system that integrates command-and-staff exercises with tactical-special training and practical involvement of cadets in maintaining public security in border settlements. This approach ensures that future officers develop resilient skills in neutralizing sabotage threats and effective cooperation in combat conditions.*

**Keywords:** *National Guard of Ukraine, reconnaissance and sabotage groups, armed conflicts, intelligence activities, tactical methods, border area, sabotage protection, higher education institutions, command-and-staff exercises, tactical-special training, public security.*

**Statement of the problem.** The current stage of russian military aggression is characterized by the extensive expansion of the zone of sabotage and terrorist activity, due, in particular, to the thousand-kilometer front line and months of positional battles. An additional source of tension is the militarization of the northern border of Ukraine, manifested in the concentration of troops of the Republic of Belarus, their large-scale exercises with live fire, and the functioning of bases for training illegal military formations (such as the "Wagner" private military company). This situation forces the military command of Ukraine to involve additional resources to deter potential threats and intensify intelligence. Consequently, during the legal regime of martial law, the functional role of the National Guard of Ukraine (NGU) units is as follows: they are actively involved in the defense of the state, territorial defense, and ensuring all necessary measures provided by the martial law regime in response to

the threat to the sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine.

The functional duties of the National Guard of Ukraine units established for the period of martial law include participation in independent and joint measures with the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Border Guard Service, the State Special Transport Service, and the Security Service of Ukraine, aimed at countering the aggressor's reconnaissance and sabotage forces [sabotage groups (RSGs)] and illegal paramilitary or armed formations. In addition, NGU units are involved in the defense of Ukraine through direct combat operations, carried out by the decision of the military command, in accordance with the requirements of the Law of Ukraine "On the Defense of Ukraine" [1].

The National Guard of Ukraine, as a military formation with law enforcement functions, designed to perform tasks of protecting and guarding the lives, rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of citizens, plays an important role in

ensuring the fight against reconnaissance and sabotage groups on the territory of Ukraine [1]. However, the issues of organization, interaction, and involvement of NGU forces and means in the fight against RSGs under martial law require further research.

**Analysis of recent research and publications.**

The issue of coordination and interaction of various law enforcement subjects during measures to counter the aggressor's reconnaissance and sabotage groups is the subject of attention of a significant number of scientists. Among the researchers who have focused on these issues are O. Hluzdan, V. Horodnov, Yu. Ivashkov, R. Karataiev, V. Kyrylenko, V. Kurnikov, and B. Oleksiienko. Additionally, a separate group of scientists, including S. Moskalenko, R. Kaliuzhnyi, V. Kaminskyi, I. Sopilko, H. Spitsyna, and I. Shynkarenko, focused on the methodological aspect – studying the problem of ranking the degree of importance of key features of illegal activities of illegal armed formations and creating their hierarchical sequence using the taxonomic method of analysis.

Despite the presence of a significant number of scientific works examining the interaction of law enforcement agencies in countering RSGs, available publications selectively touch upon the legal and psychological aspects of this activity under martial law. In view of this, there is a need for a comprehensive study of the fight against illegal armed formations and RSGs of the aggressor country, which would cover not only legal science but also practical knowledge of general military tactics and tactical-special training of future NGU officers.

**The purpose of the article** is to formulate priority areas for increasing the level of tactical-special training of future officers of the National Guard of Ukraine. This improvement should enhance their effectiveness in fighting illegal armed formations and in countering the enemy's reconnaissance and sabotage groups.

To achieve this goal, the following objectives have been defined for the study:

1) to establish the legal, psychological, and organizational foundations for countering RSG activities by law enforcement subjects both in Ukraine and considering international experience;

2) to study the criteria for assessing the predicted level of vulnerability of reconnoitered objects to RSG impact, as well as to develop effective tools for the identification and neutralization of these groups;

3) to analyze the factors determining the effectiveness of search measures aimed at countering RSGs, carried out jointly with other interacting units within territorial communities located in combat zones.

To fulfill these tasks, a complex of scientific methods was applied in the work: at the theoretical level, analysis, systematization, and generalization of normative legal acts and scientific sources were used to determine the legal basis for countering illegal armed formations, as well as comparative analysis to study foreign experience in organizing military units that fight these formations; at the empirical level, observations, interviews, and surveys were used to assess the level of professional readiness of National Guard of Ukraine units to detect and neutralize enemy reconnaissance and sabotage groups.

**Summary of the main material.** During the first month of Russia's full-scale invasion alone, Ukrainian law enforcement agencies demonstrated high efficiency in countering enemy activity. Specifically, more than 370 individuals involved in the activities of reconnaissance and sabotage groups were detained. A characteristic feature of this activity was the detainees' use of military uniforms of the Ukrainian security and defense forces for camouflage purposes. In addition, a significant number of Russian special services agents were exposed, and the activities of transnational channels used to recruit mercenaries for the armed forces of the aggressor country were terminated. Russian occupation forces continue to purposefully terrorize the border regions of Ukraine, including Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia regions. The activity of reconnaissance and sabotage groups poses a direct threat to the civilian population, as the enemy resorts to ambush attacks on any vehicles, which is a gross violation of the laws and customs of war. Moreover, in the south, particularly in the Kherson region on the right bank of the Dnipro River, the adversary regularly uses boat-based RSGs for reconnaissance. The main tasks of these groups are the destruction of civilian infrastructure, the dissemination of disinformation (fakes), and the identification of the exact locations of Ukrainian security and defense forces for subsequent adjustment of artillery fire, drone attacks, or missile strikes.

To ensure the effectiveness of counter-sabotage measures, it is necessary to study the historical context of the emergence of specialized units. Although the earliest mentions of reconnaissance and sabotage activity date back to the ancient

world, such as centurion reconnaissance detachments in the Roman Empire or specialized hoplite units in Greece, this activity was only embryonic at that time. Already during the Hetmanate period, special Cossack detachments performed purely sabotage functions, conducting raids behind enemy lines to cause significant damage to their fortified objects, while always avoiding open military clashes. The principles of RSG activity underwent radical changes in the 20th century, especially during the First World War as a result of the transition to positional warfare [11].

Analysis of scientific sources allows for the conclusion that a reconnaissance and sabotage group is a maneuverable special-purpose unit. Such formations are part of land or naval forces and usually number from 2 to 10 people. Reconnaissance and sabotage groups are employed both in the pre-war period and during military conflict (wartime), and their primary goal is to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage measures deep behind enemy lines.

The defining characteristics of reconnaissance and sabotage groups have several distinctive features.

1. *Mobility.* Due to their small size, groups can move quickly and cover significant distances, ensuring operational efficiency.

2. *Thorough Training.* RSG members undergo comprehensive and specialized training, covering mine-clearing and explosives, firearms, physical, psychological, medical, and engineering training, as well as, if necessary, parachute, underwater, or alpine training.

3. *Autonomy (Stealth).* Groups possess the ability to act covertly and independently on enemy territory for a long time, minimizing external support.

4. *Specialized Equipment.* Participants use non-standard equipment, trying to avoid the use of general-purpose military weapons.

5. *High Risk and Status.* In case of exposure or capture of the fighters, their command very rarely takes measures for their release or rescue. This is due to the high risk of subsequent recruitment of the captured specialists by the enemy army, which makes participation in an RSG an extremely risky form of activity [4].

The activities of reconnaissance and sabotage groups are regulated by a number of provisions of international and military law. According to these norms, the conduct of sabotage activities is lawful only on the condition that the opposing states officially recognize the state of war.

In accordance with the provisions of international humanitarian law, reconnaissance and sabotage groups have the right to inflict damage exclusively on the enemy's military objectives. The list of such legitimate targets includes:

- personnel of the enemy armed forces;
- strategic structures (e.g., command posts, communication hubs);
- military equipment and weaponry;
- enemy reconnaissance and sabotage groups;
- facilities belonging to the military-industrial complex (factories, warehouses supporting the conduct of war).

It is important to emphasize that the aforementioned list of targets is exhaustive (exclusive). Any infliction of damage on other objects not included in this list will be regarded as a war crime under international law [12].

According to the provisions of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (of June 8, 1977), which regulates the protection of victims of international armed conflicts, a categorical ban is established on turning civilian objects into targets for attack or applying coercive measures to them. Furthermore, this Protocol strictly prohibits any actions aimed at the destruction, damage, or disabling of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, namely: food supplies, agricultural areas, livestock, drinking water sources, and irrigation systems. This restriction is in place to prevent the use of such resources as a means of sustenance or for the artificial provocation of hunger among civilians, forcing their evacuation, or achieving any other goal.

The execution of sabotage measures is categorically prohibited regarding the following categories of objects and persons:

- a) the peaceful (civilian) population;
- b) medical facilities and vehicles used for medical purposes (including military medical institutions and transport);
- c) institutions belonging to the International Red Cross (or Red Crescent);
- d) objects of civilian and humanitarian purpose.

The rules of engagement require that members of reconnaissance and sabotage groups must use uniforms with clear distinctive signs of their state while performing their tasks. If this requirement is violated (i.e., they operate without identifying marks), their activity may be qualified as possessing the characteristics of terrorism [5].

In the context of state defense, the National Guard of Ukraine is based on the Constitution of Ukraine, as well as the Laws of Ukraine "On the Defense of Ukraine," "On the National Guard of

Ukraine," "On the Foundations of National Resistance," and the Military Security Strategy of Ukraine. These normative legal acts establish the organizational and legal foundations of national resistance, outlining the procedure for its preparation, implementation, and conduct, as well as defining specific tasks and powers of both the security and defense forces and all subjects responsible for this process [1].

World War II significantly influenced the formation of the military doctrines of the world's leading states, which began to orient toward conducting combat operations aimed at the total destruction of the adversary country. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a reduction in overall military-economic potential. This caused a shift in the strategic vector toward the improvement of high-precision weaponry. A clear confirmation of this evolution is the military operations conducted at the beginning of the 21st century, characterized by the massive use of specifically high-precision weapons.

Taking into account the established characteristics and types of activity of reconnaissance and sabotage groups, there is a need to determine the organizational features of the foundations of conducting defensive combat by ground force units of leading countries. In particular, an analysis of the experience of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the United States of America (USA) is critically important.

According to the military doctrines of the aforementioned countries (FRG and USA), the primary goal of a defensive operation is to neutralize the enemy's offensive efforts. This is achieved by inflicting the maximum possible losses in personnel and military equipment on enemy forces. The ultimate tactical result of defense is gaining the time necessary for the regrouping and concentration of one's own troops in the most advantageous direction with the subsequent goal of transitioning to an offensive.

U.S. military manuals provide for several methods of conducting defensive actions, including area defense (positional), used to hold specific sectors by fire from stationary positions, and mobile defense, which requires the sequential holding of temporary positions while simultaneously conducting counterattacks in designated areas forward of the main line. Structurally, the defense is organized around three key elements: the security area, the main battle area, and the rear area.

*The security area* is a section of terrain with a depth of 15 km to 70 km located forward of the forward defensive positions. It is equipped with engineering structures and screening (deterrence) forces during organized defense or a planned withdrawal. The main task of the screening forces in this area is to slow the pace of the enemy's advance, identify the priority directions of their main strikes, and deceive the enemy regarding the actual location of the main resistance forces.

The main battle area is located between the security area (forward edge) and the rear area. Its key purpose is the deployment and conduct of actions by the main deterrence forces. During the organization of this area, particular attention is paid to creating an effective system of obstacles, the foundation of which is mine-explosive obstacles (MEO).

The military doctrines of the USA and the FRG have their own classifications of mine-explosive obstacles (MEO): the U.S. Army distinguishes between protective, tactical (subdivided into disruption, fixation, turn, and block), and nuisance types of MEO, while the FRG Army identifies defensive, protective, deceptive, and nuisance types. Specifically, defensive minefields aim to delay the enemy, protective ones are created to cover positions from sudden attacks, and nuisance minefields are installed in the rear to restrict maneuver and disorganize the enemy's activities in vital zones [8].

The rear area of defense is located directly behind the rear boundary of the main battle area. Its functional purpose is to provide space for the location of reserve units, as well as logistics units and administrative services. This structural element of defense is typical for military formations from the brigade level and above.

In Ukraine, the function of countering reconnaissance and sabotage groups is assigned to law enforcement subjects who use a complex of measures including various types of intelligence, operational-search and counterintelligence activities, as well as constant assessment of the changing operational situation [7].

Objects of potential interest for reconnaissance and sabotage groups include a wide range of military and civilian-strategic targets, including strategic facilities, communications, and transport routes. This category includes troop deployment areas, military infrastructure facilities, positional areas of missile forces and air defense, as well as command post deployment sites, storage bases for weapons, equipment, and logistics. Additionally, targets may include central executive authorities

and territorial recruitment and social support centers.

Signs of an individual's involvement in a reconnaissance and sabotage group encompass a complex of actions aimed at undermining security: conducting intelligence activities (specifically, detecting technical surveillance means, beacons, and long-term observation of military/border facilities), destabilizing the situation by committing criminal offenses under the guise of domestic ones (explosions, attacks), information operations involving the dissemination of false information and discredit of the authorities through mass media and personal communication, as well as network activity – searching for and financing accomplices, and camouflaging caches and hidden storages of ammunition and special equipment [13].

According to the methodology developed by A. Mysyk and O. Andrushko in 2020, the process of identifying reconnaissance and sabotage groups is structured and covers the sequential preliminary study of objects subject to protection, followed by the determination of likely threats that may originate from RSGs, and concludes with the formation of possible action scenarios of reconnaissance and sabotage groups [14].

In view of the need for effective protection, it is proposed to analyze the model of anti-sabotage protection implemented by units of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine in interaction with the National Guard within the controlled border area. This model constitutes a complex of predefined operational-search, regime, and reconnaissance-search measures, as well as practical actions aimed at protecting the border population, local self-government bodies, and ensuring the reliable protection of important critical infrastructure facilities.

In connection with the introduction of martial law in Ukraine, the state has implemented a series of measures to strengthen protection, ensure rapid response to threats, and prevent damage to or destruction of critical infrastructure facilities [2]. These steps included adjustments to the normative legal framework regulating the procedure for responding to emergencies for certain categories of critical facilities. Specifically, changes were made to the following key government documents [15]:

1) Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine "Some Issues of Critical Infrastructure Objects" (this act approved the procedures for forming the list and entering information into the State Register of Critical Information

Infrastructure Objects, and also regulates the functioning of the register itself);

2) Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine "Some Issues of Identification of High-Risk Objects" (it approved the Procedure for Identification and Accounting of High-Risk Objects and initiated the creation of the corresponding State Electronic Register);

3) Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine "On the Establishment of the State Service for Critical Infrastructure Protection and Ensuring the National Resilience System of Ukraine" (this document laid the legal basis for the creation of a central executive body with special status, responsible for the protection of critical infrastructure and ensuring the resilience of the national system).

During the execution of reconnaissance and search measures, the key task is to determine the likely location of the enemy, their observation (command) posts, and fire assets, as well as to identify telltale signs (signatures) that allow for the correct interpretation of the collected data. Such signs may include trampled areas, new paths, vehicle tracks, remains of fires, or fresh soil; however, it is important to consider that none of these signs alone is indisputable proof of the enemy's presence or intentions, and only their combination makes it possible to formulate a correct conclusion about the position and objectives of the objects [6].

To perform reconnaissance and search tasks, special formations are involved – reconnaissance and search groups. The number of personnel, their equipment, and configuration are determined according to the unit's table of organization and equipment (TO&E), but they must always be organized to ensure maximum autonomy and high mobility of the group during the mission. During a search, important parameters such as the density of the search line and the pace of advancement depend on several factors, including the nature of the terrain, the number and camouflage methods of the reconnaissance and sabotage group members, the level of professional training of the involved personnel, as well as the season and time of day.

Search operations can be implemented in several basic ways.

1. *One-way method.* Applied by two search groups moving in one direction within their established sectors of responsibility.

2. *Parallel search.* Performed by several reconnaissance and search groups in adjacent areas. Interaction and coordination between these units are carried out via radio communication.

3. *Selective search.* Used when search actions are conducted in difficult terrain or under conditions of insufficient available forces and means.

4. *Converging (counter) search.* Involves RSGs moving toward each other. To prevent cases of "Friendly Fire," established mutual recognition signals must be used, and the maximum depth to which the groups are allowed to advance must be clearly defined [5].

Conducting reconnaissance and search measures requires compliance with several mandatory rules for the preparation and equipping of personnel. Specifically, servicemen participating in the search must be provided with individual protective equipment, have a supply of dry rations for at least two days, necessary optical observation devices, a sufficient amount of ammunition, and first aid kits for providing medical assistance in case of wounding.

To avoid premature detection of reconnaissance and search groups, it is recommended to conduct search actions using the "bounding overwatch" (leapfrog) method. For example, one search line inspects a certain area of terrain while another group provides fire cover. The distance between these boundaries should be adjusted according to the terrain features and usually ranges from 25 m to 30 m. In addition, when performing reconnaissance and search tasks, the high risk of encountering explosive objects (specifically, booby traps and tripwires) must be taken into account [5].

In case of detecting suspicious objects, if appropriate disposal skills are lacking, the following actions are strictly prohibited:

a) any influence: objects must not be subjected to mechanical, thermal, acoustic, light, or any other physical influence;

b) independent inspection: it is strictly forbidden to independently open, check, or inspect suspicious containers (bags, boxes, suitcases, etc.);

c) attempts at neutralization: it is forbidden to attempt to manually neutralize or deactivate explosive or suspicious objects;

d) use of open fire and appliances: open flames, electric heating devices, or smoking must not be used near a suspicious object;

e) use of communication devices: the use of radio-transmitting devices, including mobile phones and other radio communication means, near the objects is prohibited, as the radio signal may cause detonation;

f) physical contact: it is strictly forbidden to touch explosive or suspicious objects, move them,

shift them from their place, or perform any manipulations [16].

The most effective method in the context of counter-sabotage operations is considered to be the ambush. It is used to fulfill such tasks as the destruction or capture of couriers, scouts, small enemy groups, supply (support) groups, and control points, as well as for the capture of prisoners and weapon samples. An ambush is defined as specialized unit actions involving its concealed positioning on a likely route of enemy movement. The main goal of such actions is to reduce the enemy's combat potential through their total destruction, capturing personnel, and seizing samples of weaponry and military equipment.

In military practice, numerous types of ambushes are distinguished, adapted to specific operational tasks, including: the double ambush, decoy ambush, wait-and-see (deliberate) ambush, bait-trap ambush, and ambush-raid; additionally, the "octopus" (spider) ambush is used for actions around a settlement, as well as near and far ambushes, and the ambush-attack, the essence of which is that the main forces of the unit carry out a demonstrative attack on the enemy's location, while a smaller part of the forces organizes an ambush on their likely retreat path [10].

The near ambush has several specific features that determine its tactical application.

1. Primary goal it is conducted with the intent of the total destruction of the enemy unit.

2. Force ratio it is execution is considered impractical if the number of personnel involved in the ambush is smaller than the number of the attacked enemy detachment.

3. Engagement distance it is ambush is organized at a distance not exceeding the throwing radius of a hand offensive or flash-bang grenade, emphasizing its close-quarters nature.

4. Support it is ambush necessarily relies on the use of engineering obstacles located on the opposite side of the kill zone to restrict enemy maneuver.

The unit performing a near ambush traditionally consists of three main functional groups: the security group, the support group, and the assault team [9].

Control over the unit's actions during the setup of a near ambush is exercised directly by the commander; the detachment is obliged to hold its occupied waiting position until receiving the command "Time" (signal to return to the initial line), the command "Do not open fire" (to allow significant enemy forces to pass), or until the premature detection of the group by enemy forces.

One of the most common tactical errors during a near ambush is a delay in opening fire after the first shot, as such a pause gives enemy servicemen critically necessary time for an adequate reaction to the threat, reducing the operation's effectiveness.

The goal of a far (point) ambush primarily lies in the attrition of enemy forces and inflicting damage, while total destruction of the target or collection of operational information are not priority tasks. Among its key features are the possibility of execution by smaller forces relative to the enemy and positioning outside the hand grenade throwing radius. The group includes specialized "hunter-killer" teams, a security group, and a fire support group, with the development of rapid withdrawal routes being a mandatory planning element. The opening of fire during such an ambush occurs exclusively upon the commander's order or in response to the enemy's preemptive fire. This emphasizes its controlled nature, unlike the near ambush, where the focus is on maximum concentration of fire for total destruction.

Engaging a unit in a far ambush increases the chances of detecting the enemy while simultaneously reducing the risk of personnel being wounded. However, it is important to consider that at long distances, enemy forces will actively employ measures aimed at detecting the fighters who organized the ambush and will attempt to flank them from the rear.

If a unit falls into a near ambush, it is necessary to immediately take cover and, without losing time, open intensive return fire on the ambush positions at the maximum rate of fire. Next, fragmentation and smoke grenades should be used in the direction of the enemy, followed by a counterattack on the enemy detachment. In such close-quarters combat, speed, courage, and decisiveness are decisive factors for survival. Meanwhile, the group that did not find itself in the immediate kill zone must quickly identify the ambush position, lay down suppressive fire, and then shift fire to provide fire support to the attacking group.

In the event that a reconnaissance and search group falls into a far ambush, the personnel must act according to the following algorithm.

*1. Group in the kill zone.* It is necessary to immediately open return fire, quickly take cover, and continue intensive fire toward the enemy positions. The goal is to disable the enemy's key firing points and disorganize their personnel to disrupt the ambush plans.

*2. Group outside the kill zone.* This part of the group must move covertly, maximizing the use of

terrain features, to flank the enemy and subsequently attack the positions from which the ambush is being conducted.

*3. Command.* If possible, the unit commander or the lead scout should call for fire support, specifically artillery fire or aviation.

To fulfill research tasks, tactical-special exercises were conducted at the Kharkiv National University of Internal Affairs (KhNUIA). According to KhNUIA Order No. 600 dated September 12, 2024, these activities for 2nd–4th year cadets (Faculties No. 1–4) took place from September 18 to 22, 2024, at the university's deployment sites (the cities of Vinnytsia and Kamianets-Podilskyi) under the leadership of the Department of Tactical and Special Physical Training of Faculty No. 3. Approximately 1,375 cadets participated in the training.

The training covered the following key areas.

*Firearms Training.* Classes were held to study the design and operating principles of small arms, anti-tank weapons, general-purpose grenade launchers, and hand grenades. Principles and rules of firing from the 7.62 mm AKM assault rifle were practiced from various positions (standing, kneeling, and prone).

*Identification of Explosive Ordnance (EO).* Participants studied methods for identifying EO, movement tactics in mined forested areas, and safety measures upon detecting dangerous objects. A specific algorithm for unit actions in the event of discovering mines or tripwires was practiced.

*Tactical Medicine.* Skills in stopping massive hemorrhage were improved, along with practicing self-help algorithms and providing aid to the wounded directly in the combat zone (under direct fire). Methods for moving the casualty to a safe place and conducting a primary survey according to the MARCH protocol were taught.

*Military Engineering.* This area included site selection, position equipment, the construction of fortifications, and the determination of firing sectors. Camouflaging positions was practiced, taking into account the modern capabilities of enemy aerial reconnaissance, and reconnaissance using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) was conducted. Additionally, personnel practiced actions upon the "Air Alert" signal, during threats of mortar/artillery shelling, and in case of an attack.

*CBRN Defense (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear).* Cadets practiced civil protection standards, including the rapid donning of respiratory and skin protection equipment and the replacement of filtering elements. They trained in movement while wearing personal protective

equipment and the specifics of maintaining fire contact in full gear.

The second stage of the tactical-special exercises took place on November 10, 2024. It was organized by the faculty of the Department of Tactical and Special Physical Training of Faculty No. 3 in cooperation with Military Unit No. 3008 of the National Guard of Ukraine. Approximately 50 cadets from the 1st–3rd years (Faculties No. 2 and 3) – members of the "SFP" and "SHCHYT" research and practice circles – participated.

A key element of this stage was a police quest to search for armed criminals, during which the following practical skills were practiced: combat formations, small group movement tactics, operational-tactical maneuvers, breaking contact from an ambush, setting up an ambush, and tactics for attack, defense, and raids.

Special attention was paid to the UAV squad support of the unit, whose tasks included:

- reconnaissance of the terrain and plotting the optimal route for the group;
- inspection of potentially dangerous zones, including places of possible ambush setups;
- operational support and monitoring of the group during movement;
- adjustment of the unit's actions directly during fire contact;
- practicing camouflage from enemy UAVs, as well as detecting camouflaged enemy forces using the unit's own UAV assets.

The work conducted became the theoretical basis for developing a model for countering enemy RSGs for units with law enforcement functions under martial law.

This model includes the following key elements:

- a) creation of an object dossier – analysis of an object to determine the likely degree of attack by an RSG;
- b) conducting command-and-staff exercises – organization of targeted training for the leadership of law enforcement subjects on countering RSGs, which facilitates effective interaction;
- c) staged tactical-special training – conducting practical training in two stages for in-depth skill development;
- d) involvement of cadets – engaging cadets from Ministry of Internal Affairs higher education institutions with specific training conditions in ensuring public safety and order in border regions.

## Conclusions

The implementation of effective tactical methods of counter-sabotage combat into the educational process of institutions with specific training conditions is a strategically important step for forming the professional readiness of future officers of the National Guard of Ukraine. The systematic mastery of these techniques provides the necessary complex of theoretical knowledge and practical skills, enabling servicemen to effectively counteract reconnaissance and sabotage forces in difficult conditions. The ultimate goal of such training is to strengthen the resilience of the law enforcement system, capable of adequately responding to hybrid threats, which requires high competence in the field of special operations.

The practical realization of this counter-sabotage model is critically important for solving a number of further tasks concerning state security: from training the civilian population in methods of identifying RSG members and ensuring proper legal qualification of their criminal activity to developing unified methodological recommendations. These recommendations must clearly regulate coordination and interaction between all subjects of the security and defense sector of Ukraine both during active combat (martial law) and during the period of post-war stabilization.

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**ПРОБЛЕМИ ТА НАПРЯМИ ВДОСКОНАЛЕННЯ ТАКТИКО-СПЕЦІАЛЬНОЇ ПІДГОТОВКИ ПІДРОЗДІЛІВ НАЦІОНАЛЬНОЇ ГВАРДІЇ УКРАЇНИ У ПРОТИДІЇ ДИВЕРСІЙНО-РОЗВІДУВАЛЬНИМ ГРУПАМ ПРОТИВНИКА В УМОВАХ ВОЄННОГО СТАНУ**

*Порушено питання щодо пошуку оптимальних шляхів підвищення рівня тактико-спеціальної підготовки військовослужбовців Національної гвардії України, що є критично важливим для ефективної протидії диверсійно-розвідувальним групам в умовах воєнного стану, зокрема на прикордонних територіях та в зонах активних бойових дій. Акцентовано увагу на розширенні службових повноважень військових Національної гвардії України у цей період, які передбачають спільну роботу з нейтралізації ворожих диверсійно-розвідувальних груп, а також незаконних воєнізованих чи збройних формувань, які діють у супереччя українському законодавству.*

*Для досягнення мети дослідження було здійснено глибокий аналіз міжнародно-правових та національних нормативно-правових актів, що регулюють використання диверсійно-розвідувальних груп в умовах збройного конфлікту. Детально розкрито суть і структуру (ієрархію) цих формувань. Особливу увагу приділено визначенню категорій об'єктів, щодо яких міжнародне право забороняє проведення диверсійних заходів. Крім того, на основі норм міжнародного гуманітарного права сформовано перелік військових об'єктів сторін конфлікту, яким може бути завдано шкоди.*

*У статті проаналізовано організаційні аспекти та базові принципи ведення оборонного бою підрозділами сухопутних військ окремих держав, зокрема Федеративної Республіки Німеччина та Сполучених Штатів Америки. Згідно з військовими доктринами цих країн ключова мета оборони полягає у зриві наступальних операцій противника. Це досягається шляхом завдання йому максимально можливих втрат серед особового складу та техніки, а також виграшем часу, необхідного для перегрупування і зосередження власних сил на обраному напрямку, що є підготовчою умовою для подальшого переходу в наступ.*

*Проведене дослідження передбачає всебічний аналіз міжнародного та національного законодавства щодо застосування диверсійно-розвідувальних груп у конфліктах, з'ясування їхньої ієрархічної будови та визначення об'єктів, які підпадають під міжнародно-правову заборону щодо диверсійних заходів, а також об'єктів, яким відповідно до норм міжнародного гуманітарного права дозволено завдавати шкоди. Додатково були вивчені організаційні основи оборонного бою підрозділів сухопутних військ провідних країн, зокрема Німеччини та США, метою оборони яких є максимальне виснаження наступальних сил противника і виграш часу для контрнаступу. Для підвищення готовності підрозділів Національної гвардії України було систематизовано ознаки розпізнавання членів російських диверсійно-розвідувальних груп, що передбачають розвідувальну діяльність, дестабілізацію через маскування кримінальних злочинів під побутові інциденти та інформаційну дискредитацію органів влади серед населення.*

*Упорядковано і виділено тактичні прийоми, що використовуються для ефективної протидії диверсійно-розвідувальним групам у межах контрольованого прикордонного району. Особливу увагу приділено аналізу досвіду, набутого Силами безпеки й оборони України під час проведення контрдиверсійних заходів, зокрема такого важливого елемента, як засідка. На основі цих напрацювань запропоновано модель диверсійного захисту, призначену для впровадження в освітній процес закладів вищої освіти МВС України. Ця модель передбачає комплексну двоетапну систему підготовки, яка поєднує командно-штабні навчання з тактико-спеціальними тренуваннями, а також практичне залучення курсантів до виконання завдань із забезпечення громадської безпеки та порядку в прикордонних населених пунктах.*

**Ключові слова:** *Національна гвардія України, диверсійно-розвідувальні групи, збройні конфлікти, розвідувальна діяльність, тактичні прийоми, прикордонний район, диверсійний захист, заклади вищої освіти, командно-штабні навчання, тактико-спеціальні тренування, громадська безпека.*

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