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FORMATION OF DRONE-ASSARM UNITS – AN INNOVATIVE PROJECT FOR DEVELOPING THE DEFENSE FORCES OF UKRAINE: PREREQUISITES, PROSPECTS, CHALLENGES AND WAYS OF IMPLEMENTATION

The feasibility of establishing drone-assault units as a priority area for the development of the Ukrainian Defense Forces has been substantiated. Practical recommendations have been developed regarding the organizational and staffing structure of the Ukrainian Defense Forces' drone-assault units. The prospects for developing a comprehensive model of drone assault units, which integrates organizational and staffing solutions, combat application algorithms, and approaches to personnel training into a single functional framework, are examined. A model is proposed that goes beyond the fragmented use of unmanned aerial vehicles as an auxiliary means and considers their capabilities as a system-forming factor in the conduct of combat operations, which is of fundamental importance for enhancing the combat effectiveness of the Ukrainian Defense Forces' units.

Keywords: *unmanned systems, combat application, combat experience, fire damage, drone-assault units, organizational and staffing structure, reconnaissance (strike) drones, Ukrainian Defense Forces, assault operations.*

Statement of the problem. Standard approaches to the formation and deployment of assault units remain largely focused on the traditional combination of infantry and mechanized units – a model in which unmanned systems play a supporting role. This approach does not fully account for changes in the nature of combat operations, particularly the growing role of innovative technologies, the dominance of reconnaissance-strike systems, and the shortening of the "reconnaissance – decision-making – strike" cycle.

The problem is that, at present, the Ukrainian Armed Forces lack a unified concept for establishing drone-assault units, organizational and staffing structures, personnel training standards, and algorithms for the combat use of these formations in modern warfare.

Analysis of recent research and publications. The issue of the use of unmanned systems in the military sphere has recently been the focus of attention for leading military think tanks, research institutes, and military command structures in the world's major powers. These issues have become particularly relevant with the onset of the russian federation's full-scale aggression against Ukraine and have reached a qualitatively new level of scientific research based on the intensive combat use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in all domains of warfare – on land, at sea, in the air, in space, and in cyberspace.

According to experts at the RAND Corporation (U.S.), the experience of the russia-ukraine war demonstrates that the mass deployment of low-cost UAVs enables continuous reconnaissance, surveillance, collection of enemy data, and the integration of sensors with firepower, which significantly shortens the "detection – destruction" cycle and directly influences the pace, nature, and outcomes of combat operations [1].

Researchers at the aforementioned corporation emphasize that, in the future, Army units should be organized not "around systems" but "around the information" provided by these systems, which is fully consistent with the concept of Multi-Domain Operations.

Similar conclusions have been drawn in publications by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI, UK), where the Ukrainian experience is cited as an example of accelerated military innovation in high-intensity warfare [2].

RUSI analysts emphasize that it was precisely the integration of reconnaissance, strike, and targeting UAVs into the combat ecosystem that

enabled the Ukrainian military to partially offset the enemy's numerical superiority, creating a new paradigm for the modern battlefield. At the same time, these studies focus primarily on tactics of use and technological aspects, while issues related to the organizational and staffing structure of drone-assault units are addressed only in a piecemeal manner.

A significant body of analytical data has been compiled by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, USA). Its annual reports and thematic studies analyze the impact of the widespread use of UAVs on the conduct of conventional combat operations – offense and defense [3].

In their studies, CSIS experts have expressed the view that there is a gradual shift away from the traditional use of infantry units as the primary element for breaching defenses without adequate drone air support. The authors note that in modern conditions, "infantry without drones is blind", and assault operations without constant air cover and support suffer disproportionately high casualties.

Documents prepared by NATO structures hold a special place. Reports from the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center (JALLC) emphasize that unmanned systems should be viewed not as separate assets, but as an integrated element of the command and control system for troops and weapons [4].

NATO documents stress the need to institutionalize drone-attack units, develop unified algorithms for their use at the tactical level, and standardize personnel training.

In the U.S. National Guard, these approaches have been further developed within the framework of the "transformation during combat engagement" concept and experiments with forming so-called drone-centric units – units in which unmanned systems serve as the primary means of reconnaissance, cover, and firepower [5].

U.S. Army publications emphasize that a future tactical drone-assault unit should have drones at the squad and platoon levels, as well as UAV platoons (groups) within companies and battalions. However, it should be understood that American studies are of a predictive nature and are based on training experiments, which limits their practical validation in the conditions of a real high-intensity war.

Against this backdrop, Ukrainian combat experience holds particular value, as it is consistently documented in publicly available analytical materials from the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and specialized educational and research institutions in the security and defense sector [6].

Thus, in their works, domestic experts highlight the decisive role of UAVs as a means of conducting reconnaissance operations, assessing the operational situation, engaging in counter-battery warfare, supporting assault groups in combat zones, and creating "kill zones" impassable to the enemy.

At the same time, given the objective security situation, many scientific materials have limited access and detail and do not always constitute full-fledged publications.

An analysis of domestic scientific publications shows that most studies focus on issues related to reconnaissance, fire control, and general trends in the development of unmanned systems, while the issue of their organic integration into the combat formations and organizational structure of tactical-level assault units is covered only to a limited extent or in a fragmented manner.

In this context, there is an objective need to synthesize combat experience and develop a conceptual model of drone-assault units that would meet the requirements of modern combat.

The purpose of the article is to justify the feasibility of forming drone-assault units as a priority area for the development of the Ukrainian Defense Forces and to provide practical recommendations regarding their organizational and staffing structure, training, and combat application in the realities of modern warfare.

Summary of the main material. Historically, the assault has been one of the most resource-intensive and bloody forms of combat operations. Even with the development of armored vehicles, aviation, and artillery, the success of assault operations was achieved at the cost of heavy losses of human and technical resources, rather than through skill and precision. The russian-ukrainian war was no exception and demonstrated that assaults in an environment saturated with reconnaissance and firepower are doomed to excessive losses of personnel and equipment [7].

Finding itself in a situation of strategic defense, Ukraine was forced not only to adapt traditional forms of warfare but also to rapidly develop a new military doctrine centered on unmanned systems, which ceased to be merely auxiliary tools and became a fundamental component of combat operations [8].

The following were identified as the key prerequisites for the creation of drone-assault units:

– the loss of battlefield dominance by conventional assault units;

– the high density of reconnaissance and firepower assets on the front lines, including UAVs, which led to unacceptable losses of personnel and equipment;

– the need to provide an asymmetric response to a superior enemy;

– the need to seize the initiative and increase pressure on the enemy.

Ukraine is arguably the first country in the world to have achieved a unique level of adaptation of unmanned technologies to the military sphere. According to official data from the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, as of 2026, approximately 60% – and in certain sectors of the front, up to 70% – of losses inflicted on Russian forces are caused by FPV drones, indicating the dominance of unmanned systems as the primary means of inflicting fire damage on the enemy at the tactical level [9].

The widespread use of reconnaissance and strike UAVs by both opposing sides has transformed the way modern combat is conducted.

Reconnaissance drones provide military command and control authorities with real-time information that enables them to assess the situation, direct units in combat, and adjust strikes by aircraft, artillery, and kamikaze drones. In such dangerous conditions, even well-trained personnel and equipment become vulnerable even during the advance to the front lines.

Given the realities of combat operations, approaches to organizing a classic assault have undergone a significant transformation. Combat tasks are now distributed among interconnected elements of a unified combat system, each with a clear functional purpose, namely:

– unmanned systems (drones) – conducting reconnaissance, detecting and engaging enemy firepower and key defensive elements;

– electronic warfare systems – disrupting the enemy's command, control, communications, and navigation systems, and reducing the effectiveness of their unmanned and firepower assets;

– assault units – the physical capture, mopping up, and holding of designated strongpoints (positions), carried out following the prior suppression of the enemy through fire and information operations.

Thus, assaults on enemy positions ceased to be conducted "head-on" and instead took on the character of phased pressure on the enemy using forces and means, which became the basis for the concept of creating drone-assault units – a logical combination of high-tech reconnaissance and strike assets with a limited but well-trained assault component [10].

Indeed, as early as January 20, 2026, Ukrainian Defense Minister M. Fedorov announced the launch of a new initiative – the creation of drone-assault units. During his speech, the official noted that the 475th Separate Assault Regiment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, thanks to the creation of a drone-assault unit within its ranks, conducted a unique military operation in the Kupiansk area of the Kharkiv region, aimed at "cutting off" the enemy's supply lines. In addition,

M. Fedorov emphasized that the creation of drone-assault units is an important initiative, as these units have already proven their effectiveness [11].

The concept of forming new units involves delivering fire strikes against the enemy beyond the range of direct impact on personnel, which fundamentally changes the combat architecture: drones cease to be merely support assets for infantry units; rather, drones become the primary means of conducting combat operations, while infantry serves as the final element of the operation.

Thus, a drone-assault unit is an autonomous tactical formation in which unmanned systems serve as the primary means of reconnaissance and engaging enemy personnel, weapons, and equipment, while assault platoons (groups) are deployed to complete the combat mission and consolidate the results of the assault operations.

Drone-assault units are engaged in drone-assault combat – a form of combat in which the majority of enemy engagements are carried out by unmanned systems to minimize direct fire contact for personnel.

It is important to understand that a drone-assault unit must function as a single integrated combat system, within which each element performs specific combat tasks:

– command and control bodies – manage the units based on the continuous collection and analysis of operational intelligence on the enemy;

– UAV units – conduct reconnaissance, strike operations, and exert psychological pressure on the enemy;

– assault units – carry out limited-scale but decisive missions to capture enemy areas (positions);

– support unit – provides comprehensive support for the execution of combat missions by drone-assault units.

Organizationally, a drone-assault formation can range in size from a company to a brigade – the variation depends on the assigned tasks, available resources, and depth of operations [12].

A typical drone-assault company is designed to conduct combat operations as part of a battalion or as a reinforced tactical unit during assault, stabilization, raid, and defensive missions. The company is organized based on the principle of functional integration of unmanned and assault components, with the capability for autonomous combat operations over a limited period of time.

Given the mission and nature of the combat tasks performed, it is advisable to consider a tentative organizational and staffing structure for a drone-assault company, which should ensure the integrated use of unmanned systems, firepower assets, and assault units and include the following main elements:

1) company command: company commander; deputy company commander for unmanned systems; operations planning and analysis officer (S2/S3 – planning, results assessment, database management); command and communications group (signals officer, command system operators, digital systems administrators); analytical (operational-information) group (intelligence integration, georeferencing, real-time target designation);

2) reconnaissance UAV platoon: close reconnaissance section (quadcopters); tactical reconnaissance section (medium range); relay and secure communications support group; (optional) night/thermal imaging reconnaissance or specialized sensors group;

3) assault UAV platoon: direct-attack FPV drone section; loitering munitions section; remote mining/special weapons section (if available); technical team (repair, modernization, reprogramming, and preparation of unmanned systems); munitions preparation and loading team;

4) assault platoon: 2-3 assault squads (small tactical groups); fire support group (machine guns, grenade launchers); engineer-sapper group (clearing passages/setting up mine-explosive barriers); reserve (maneuver) group;

5) logistics platoon: logistics support squad/group (UAVs, ammunition, food, etc.); power supply squad/group (batteries, charging stations, generators); electronic warfare and counter-UAV section/group (protection of friendly communication channels, countering enemy drones); medical section/group (stabilization and evacuation of the wounded); transport section/group.

This composition of a drone-assault company ensures a continuous cycle of "detection – engagement – assessment – seizure of position – retention", which aligns with the concept of deploying drone-assault units in modern warfare.

Total company strength: 90–120 service members.

A key feature of the drone-assault company is that the assault platoon is not the primary strike element; rather, it is deployed only after the enemy has been neutralized by strike drones and a tactical advantage has been achieved.

For the National Guard of Ukraine, the versatility of such units – capable of operating both in combat zones and during stabilization operations – is particularly important.

A key feature of such units is the shortened "reconnaissance – decision-making – strike" cycle, where the commander has various types of drones at his disposal – the primary means of reconnaissance and firepower against the enemy – and can, with their support, rapidly adjust the actions of assault groups [13].

The coordination of drone-assault units with ground forces and aviation must take place within the overall military command and control system, with operational information obtained from reconnaissance drones transmitted to subordinate and cooperating units in real time – "online" [14]. The combat experience gained by the Ukrainian Armed Forces during 2024–2026 allows us to identify a number of key tactical advantages resulting from the deployment of drone-assault units to carry out combat missions:

– first, reduced personnel losses: the bulk of casualties is shifted to the non-contact domain, which is critically important given the understaffing of units and mobilization pressures;

– second, an increase in the pace of operations: UAV units do not require prolonged artillery preparation, as decisions are made in real time;

– third, the psychological effect: the constant presence of drones over enemy positions demoralizes personnel and reduces the resilience of defenses, as has been repeatedly noted in ISW reports [15].

Despite the obvious advantages, the creation of drone-assault units is accompanied by a number of key challenges:

– a shortage of trained personnel: since drone pilots and assault troops are specialists in different fields, their integration into a single unit requires appropriate training and combat coordination as drone-assault units;

– countermeasures against electronic warfare and C-UAS (specialized systems for countering UAVs): the effectiveness of strike units decreases during the intensive use of EW and C-UAS measures, which requires the development of robust protocols for managing communication channels and "fallback" capabilities, autonomous guidance, and GPS-independent algorithms, etc. [16];

– dependence on technological components and production scale: the widespread use of "disposable" strike UAVs makes it critical for the national industry to be able to rapidly replenish stocks while maintaining the quality and compatibility of drone components [17];

– legal and ethical limits on use: the use of autonomous weapon systems, striking infrastructure and civilian targets, and determining the distinction between military and civilian targets require clear legal norms and rules of engagement [18];

– cybersecurity: a networked UAV control system increases the risks of data interception and loss of drone control; therefore, the security of control channels and protocols to minimize data loss are of paramount importance [14].

It is important to understand that the deployment of drone-based assault units is an objective response to the transformation of the architecture of war. The systematic formation of these units makes it possible to significantly reduce casualties, increase the effectiveness of combat operations, and bring a new level of quality to assault operations.

According to military analysts, modern offensive (assault) operations in Ukraine are carried out as a cyclical reconnaissance-strike process, encompassing continuous aerial surveillance, isolation of the combat zone by neutralizing command-and-control systems, sequential fire exhaustion of the enemy, and subsequent actions by small assault groups followed by an assessment of the results.

Military experts propose a phased algorithm for the deployment of drone-assault units.

Phase 1 – Reconnaissance and initial assessment of the situation: a platoon of reconnaissance drones conducts continuous aerial surveillance of the area of future combat operations, during which elements of platoon strongpoints (squad positions, firepower and armored vehicles, trenches, and communication trenches), logistics routes, and advance routes are identified. The collected information is transmitted in real time to the unit commander and the analytical team for data processing and decision-making.

Phase 2 – Situation Assessment and Selection of Course of Action: Based on the data received, priority targets are identified, along with the extent to which the enemy is equipped with various types of weapons, including UAVs, and the capabilities of its artillery support. After assessing the situation, the commander of the drone assault unit decides on the sequence of strikes against the enemy.

Phase 3 – Isolation of the combat zone: a platoon of strike drones carries out a surprise strike on the enemy's command post, observation posts, and UAV operator positions to prevent (or complicate) the enemy's ability to organize command and coordination among units during combat.

Phase 4 – Fire Suppression and Demoralization: Pilots of FPV drones and loitering munitions destroy key firing positions, cover for enemy personnel, and military equipment, and exert psychological pressure on the enemy through their constant presence in the air.

Phase 5 – Deployment of assault platoons (groups): an assault platoon (group) is deployed into combat on a limited basis and for a short time, after the enemy's will to resist has been crushed, with a clearly defined mission – to clear the area (position), occupying it, and establishing full control over it.

Phase 6 – Consolidation and Holding: After establishing full control over the area (position), the unit is regrouped, the area (position) is reconnoitered using drones, personnel are prepared for possible enemy counterattacks, and the area (position) is held until the arrival of friendly main forces.

Phase 7 – Assessment of the assault results and preparation for the next cycle: the results of the drone-assisted assault operations are documented; the results of the combat mission are evaluated and analyzed; and plans for further actions are formulated [19].

Thus, a key feature of combat operations by a drone-assault unit is that assault operations are

viewed as one of the stages rather than the primary means of achieving the objective, transforming the assault from a resource-intensive and dangerous operation into a technologically controlled process, focused on preserving personnel by engaging them in limited and brief fire contact with the enemy and achieving a tactical advantage over the enemy.

Implementing the concept of drone-assault units within the Ukrainian Defense Forces requires a comprehensive, phased, and institutionally anchored approach. This is not about piecemeal reinforcement of existing assault units with unmanned systems, but rather a systemic transformation of command structures, organizational and staffing frameworks, combat methods, and personnel training. A decisive factor in such a transformation is the integration of real-time intelligence data into the commander's decision-making process and ensuring a high tempo of combat mission execution.

First and foremost, the fundamental approach to implementing this concept is the organizational and structural institutionalization of drone-assault units. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that the ad hoc use of assigned UAV crews by ground units does not ensure consistent effectiveness. Instead, it is necessary to create tactical formations that organically combine drone and assault units with clearly defined functions: aerial reconnaissance, target detection, fire correction, direct engagement, and assessment of combat results. This approach makes it possible to reduce time gaps in the "detection – decision – strike" cycle.

Another important aspect of implementing this concept is revising the principles of tactical command and coordination. In drone-assault units, the commander gains significantly more reliable tools for unit command, based on constant access to up-to-date operational information received from reconnaissance drones. This necessitates a shift from a rigidly centralized command model to a more flexible, network-oriented one, where assault unit commanders and UAV operators operate within a single reconnaissance-strike loop. In this context, drones are viewed not as "support assets" but as integral elements of the battle order, influencing route selection, pace of advance, the method of storming an area (position), and the timing of assault units' entry into combat.

The unification and standardization of algorithms for their deployment are of great importance for the practical implementation of the concept of drone-assault units. Combat experience has shown that the effectiveness of these units directly depends on the existence of clearly defined processes: combat preparation, deployment of unmanned systems, organization of continuous aerial reconnaissance, synchronization of strike drones and assault groups, and ensuring reliable control in the face of active countermeasures by enemy electronic warfare assets.

The development of standard algorithms for the use of these units must take into account various terrain conditions, the nature of combat missions, and the extent to which the enemy is equipped with reconnaissance and strike capabilities. At the same time, these algorithms must be based not only on generalized combat experience but also on its systematization and codification, which will ensure a unified approach to unit command and increase the predictability of the results of their combat deployment.

The next key step in implementing this concept is the transformation of the personnel training system. Drone-based assault units require not only qualified UAV operators, but also commanders capable of thinking in terms of integrated combat, where the air component is a constant and primary criterion for decision-making. In this context, the curricula of higher military educational institutions must provide for the development of robust competencies in future officers regarding the use of unmanned systems, planning operations involving drones, and organizing command and coordination in conditions of information overload.

A separate aspect of implementing this concept is the integration of drone-assault units into the overall combat support system. The widespread use of UAVs requires appropriate logistical support and a system for rapid restoration of combat readiness. In this regard, it is advisable to establish specialized technical support elements for UAV units within battalions or brigades, capable of performing repairs, modernization, and adaptation of unmanned systems directly in the mission area. This approach makes it possible to reduce dependence on centralized supply channels and increase the resilience of drone-assault units during prolonged combat operations.

Another equally important step in implementing this concept is the formal and doctrinal integration of drone assault units into the system of combat regulations, guidelines, and methodological recommendations. In the absence of clear regulatory guidelines, there is a risk of fragmented implementation of innovations and differing

interpretations in approaches to the formation and use of these units. Incorporating provisions regarding the use of drone-assault units into guiding documents will contribute to the unification of approaches, improved manageability, and coordination of unit actions within a single operational concept.

Thus, the implementation of the concept of drone-assault units is a multidimensional process that combines organizational, tactical, training, and regulatory measures. The success of this process directly depends on the military command system's ability to integrate combat experience into structural decisions, ensure systematic training of personnel, and create the conditions for the sustainable development of unmanned aviation capabilities within the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Conclusions

An analysis of recent foreign and domestic studies, combined with a synthesis of the combat experience of the Ukrainian Defense Forces (2022–2026), indicates that the formation of drone-assault units is a sustained trend in the development of modern armed forces, rather than a temporary adaptation to the conditions of a specific conflict. The widespread use of unmanned systems fundamentally transforms the logic of combat – the emphasis shifts from physical dominance in space to information dominance, where operational intelligence data is immediately converted into precision strikes against the enemy using firepower.

It is important to understand that the classical model of assault operations, which was based on the linear advance of units under the cover of firepower, demonstrates limited effectiveness in modern conditions where the battlefield is saturated with surveillance, precision strike, and electronic warfare capabilities. In contrast, drone-assault units, in which unmanned systems are a core element of the battle order, provide comprehensive advantages: continuous operations of the unmanned reconnaissance-strike loop, a reduced combat control cycle, minimization of direct contact between personnel and the enemy, and flexible deployment of the assault component into combat.

This article examines the prospects for developing a comprehensive model of drone-based assault units that integrates organizational and staffing solutions, combat application algorithms, and approaches to personnel training into a single functional framework. The proposed model goes beyond the fragmented use of UAVs as an auxiliary tool and considers the capabilities of drones as a system-defining factor in combat operations, which is of fundamental importance for enhancing the combat effectiveness of the Ukrainian Defense Forces' units.

It is worth noting that the effective implementation of this concept is possible only if it is institutionally anchored – through doctrinal formalization, including the updating of combat regulations, the development of unified standards for organizational and staffing structures and algorithms of use, and the integration of relevant modules into the curricula of military universities and the combat training system. In the absence of such unified approaches, there is a risk of fragmented implementation of technological innovations, and the level of command and control over units in complex tactical situations is reduced.

Further research on the formation and deployment of drone-assault units should focus on priority areas relevant to the context of the russia-ukraine war, specifically: developing tactics for integrated actions and coordination among reconnaissance, strike, and assault elements during drone-assault operations and countermeasures against enemy UAVs and electronic warfare assets to enhance the survivability and resilience of command-and-control systems; researching the managerial aspects of drone-assault unit commanders' activities in the context of high information and combat dynamics during battle, with the aim of shortening decision-making cycles and simultaneously managing heterogeneous forces and assets while executing combat missions.

Focusing on these areas will contribute to the development of a scientifically grounded model for the development of drone assault units and ensure their effective integration into the combat employment system of the Ukrainian Defense Forces.

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ФОРМУВАННЯ ДРОНОВО-ШТУРМОВИХ ПІДРОЗДІЛІВ – ІННОВАЦІЙНИЙ ПРОЄКТ РОЗБУДОВИ СИЛ ОБОРОНИ УКРАЇНИ: ПЕРЕДУМОВИ, ПЕРСПЕКТИВИ, ВИКЛИКИ ТА ШЛЯХИ РЕАЛІЗАЦІЇ

Проаналізовано сучасні умови використання безпілотних літальних апаратів, які еволюціонували від допоміжного засобу підтримки підрозділів до системотвірного елемента бойових дій. Розглянуто у цьому контексті дроново-штурмові підрозділи як новий тип тактичних формувань, в яких основний обсяг завдань із розвідки, ураження противника та контролю результатів бою виконується безпілотними системами, тоді як застосування штурмових взводів (груп) має обмежений, завершальний характер і спрямоване на закріплення досягнутого результату з мінімізацією втрат особового складу.

Досліджено аналітичні матеріали провідних міжнародних дослідницьких центрів (RAND Corporation, RUSI, CSIS, JALLC), доктринальні документи НАТО та узагальнений бойовий досвід Сил оборони України щодо розвитку сучасної тактики, удосконалення діяльності органів військового управління і трансформації організаційно-штатних структур в умовах інтенсивного запровадження інноваційних технологій.

Визначено основні передумови формування дроново-штурмових підрозділів, серед яких ключовими є підвищення прозорості поля бою завдяки масовому застосуванню доступних безпілотних систем, дефіцит особового складу та значні втрати під час проведення традиційних наступальних дій. Акцентовано увагу на тому, що у війні на виснаження тактичну перевагу отримує та протидіюча сторона, яка здатна забезпечити інформаційне домінування, оперативне дистанційне ураження виявлених цілей та мінімізацію безпосереднього контакту особового складу з противником. Сформовано цілісну концепцію дроново-штурмових підрозділів, яка передбачає інтеграцію органів військового управління, безпілотних систем, штурмових елементів, алгоритмів бойового застосування та системи підготовки особового складу в єдину функціональну систему управління і вогневого впливу.

Запропоновано узагальнену модель організаційної структури дроново-штурмової роти, визначено основні принципи її бойового застосування та загальні підходи до організації бойового забезпечення.

Підкреслено, що практичне значення отриманих результатів полягає у можливості їх використання під час формування та підготовки дроново-штурмових підрозділів у складі Сил оборони України, удосконалення системи бойової підготовки та інтеграції відповідних положень до освітніх програм вищих військових навчальних закладів України.

Узагальнено, що формування та всебічне забезпечення дроново-штурмових підрозділів є одним із ключових напрямів адаптації Сил оборони України до надання асиметричної відповіді переважаючому противнику в умовах інтенсивної та високотехнологічної війни, і реалізація цього напряму потребує системного наукового супроводу, нормативно-правового закріплення та комплексної інтеграції набутого бойового досвіду в освітні, організаційні та управлінські процеси.

Ключові слова: *безпілотні системи, бойове застосування, бойовий досвід, вогневе ураження, дроново-штурмові підрозділи, організаційно-штатна структура, розвідувальні (ударні) дрони, Сили оборони України, штурмові дії.*

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